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Political Islam: Between the Illusion of “Victory” and the Reality of Failure

Wael Sultan

Islam is the Deen of Allah ﷻ, which He revealed to the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ to solve the problems of humankind and regulate his three relationships: his relationship with his Lord, his relationship with other human beings, and his relationship with himself. Therefore, Islam is a comprehensive religion, and that includes the state. It is a Deen that provides for those who believe in it devotional and moral laws, and a State that takes care of people’s affairs, rules between them by Islam, deals with other states according to its rulings, and carries the message of Islam to the world.

From here, an important question arises: When did modern thought begin classifying the Islam that deals with matters of governance, society, and public relations under the label of “Political Islam”? And what existed before the emergence of this classification?

Islam did not begin as “political” in the twentieth century; rather, what has emerged recently is the classification of “Political Islam” as an independent phenomenon in modern political science and sociology, and the resulting placement of Islam and the movements based on it within the political sphere into a new terminological framework.

Among the earliest documented academic uses of the term that we encounter is in the 1980 book, *Political Islam*, by the American researcher Martin Kramer. However, the mere

appearance of the term in modern literature does not mean that Islamic thought has approved of it as a correct concept, or that Muslims prior to that distinguished between “Islam” and “political Islam”; for the existence and spread of a term is one thing, and the validity of the concept it denotes is another.

Hence, the problematic issue emerges: if Islam, in its general conception, addresses both the private and public affairs of human beings and includes rulings related to governance, judiciary, economy, international relations, and other matters, then what does it mean to describe this aspect of Islam as “political”? And does this term lead to assuming a duality between a religious Islam and a political Islam, as if politics were an extraneous element added to Islam in the modern era?

This question becomes even more important when we move from the term to the movements described by this label: if “Political Islam” is a modern and semantically imprecise term, then what do we mean when we talk about its success or failure? Is it sufficient for an Islamic movement to reach parliament, form a government, or reach the pinnacle of power for that to be considered a victory for Islam?

Or is the matter merely a political success for a movement operating within an existing political system, without necessarily meaning the success of the project which that movement claims it came to achieve?

From this point begins the inquiry into the more important question: Was the arrival of some Islamic movements into the institutions of the contemporary political system a victory for Islam, or was it a victory for political movements that managed to succeed within a system whose foundations remained unchanged?

The term “political Islam” was not the conceptual framework employed by Muslim scholars when addressing the issue of governance and politics; they addressed it within the concepts of Imamah (Shariah leadership), Khilafah (Caliphate), Shariah Politics (as-Siyasah ash-Shar’iyyah), and Rulings of Authority (Al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah).

Thus, Al-Mawardi discusses the Imamah, its functions, the preservation of the religion, the implementation of Shariah rulings, and the realization of justice in his book Al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah (Rulings of Authority).

As for Ibn Taymiyyah, he states that ولاية أمر الناس من أعظم (governing the affairs of the people is among the greatest obligations of the Deen, and that neither the Deen nor worldly affairs can be established except through it.”

As for Ibn Khaldun, he defines the Khilafah as خلافة عن صاحب (succession to the bringer of Shariah Law, (Muhammad ﷺ), in the guardianship of the Deen and the governance of worldly affairs by it.”

Thus, we see that Muslim 'ulema did not treat governance and politics as a domain added to Islam, nor as a "type of Islam" that stands in contrast to the Islam of worship and morality. Rather, they studied them within the very system of Islam itself, under the headings of Imamah, Khilafah, Shariah Politics, and Rulings of Authority.

So what happened in the modern era that we now need to classify movements calling for the application of Islam in governance under the label "Political Islam?"

From the Khilafah to the Modern State

The most significant transformation that Muslims have faced in the modern era has been their transition from a political reality in which the Khilafah, the Imamate, and the general framework of the Shariah were present in the conception of the state, to a new reality where nation-states with independent political borders, constitutions, modern institutions, and legal systems were formed, alongside the decline of the unifying political frame of reference for Muslims.

The abolition of the Ottoman Khilafah on March 3, 1924, was a decisive milestone in this transformation. The Turkish National Assembly abolished the position of the Khilafah and simultaneously established institutional structures oriented toward the new secular system. The impact of this transformation was not confined to Turkey; rather, the Muslim World, following the fall of the Ottoman state, became distributed among multiple national or regional states, each with its own political and legal system. This was a new reality that differed from the political framework with which classical Islamic political jurisprudence texts had engaged.

In this context, contemporary Islamic movements emerged as a response to this new reality. A prominent example is the Muslim Brotherhood, founded by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928, four years after the abolition of the Khilafah. Academic sources describe it as one of the oldest contemporary religious-political movements; it began with a reformist and proselytizing project, and then its activities increasingly turned toward the political sphere.

In the Indian subcontinent, within the same context, the project of Abul A'la Maududi emerged. He founded the Jamaat-e-Islami in 1941 and worked on re-formulating the concept of the Islamic state in confrontation with nationalism and the modern

state. Specialized studies indicate that Maududi's project was not merely a literal restoration of the classical theory of the Khilafah, but rather an attempt to formulate an Islamic state capable of functioning within the reality of the modern state.

And They Seek “Victory”

If the emergence of modern Islamic movements occurred within a new political reality, then the question that imposes itself is not how these movements managed to reach power? But rather: what did they actually intend to achieve by reaching it in the first place?

A movement that proceeds from the premise that Islam is not merely acts of worship and ethics, but rather a comprehensive system for life, and that governance must be established upon the foundation of the Islamic creed, cannot make merely reaching the institutions of governance the criterion for the success of its project; because reaching power is not the ultimate goal, but rather the goal is what this authority will do, and upon what basis it will be established.

And here lies the problem that warrants pause: some Islamic movements have sought to work within the existing political systems, entered elections and parliaments, allied with various political forces, and then sought to reach government or the presidency of the state, based on the premise that possessing the tools of power would then enable them to bring Islam to governance.

However, this path raises a fundamental question: If the existing system is built upon foundations and concepts that contradict the vision from which the movement originates, is it possible to achieve a change in that system by adhering to its

rules and mechanisms without this adherence leading to a change in the project itself?

The problem is not in entering elections or parliament as they are two means, but rather in the means turning into an end, and in success in obtaining votes, seats, and positions becoming the measure by which the strength of the Islamic project is judged.

And at this point, the illusion of victory begins: that a movement reaches governance and believes it has brought Islam to rule, while what may have actually reached power is an Islamic movement operating within a political system whose foundations and legislative reference have not changed.

Hence, it is necessary to distinguish between two matters: the political success of a movement, and the success of the project whose slogan the movement raises.

A movement may succeed in elections, obtain a parliamentary majority, form a government, and perhaps even reach the presidency of the state; all of that is indeed political success, but does it necessarily mean that Islam has been victorious?

This is the question that must be answered, not replaced with the question: How many seats did the movement obtain? How many ministers did it get? Did it reach the pinnacle of power?

If the goal is to establish a governance system based on Islam, then the criterion for success must necessarily be related to the extent to which this goal is achieved, not merely by the amount of success the movement has attained within the existing political system.

And after all this, the illusion of victory does not lie in the fact that Islamic movements have entered the political arena or reached some institutions of governance, but rather in considering their mere arrival there a victory for Islam, even though the movement has become a part of the very reality it was originally established to change.

Thus, when a movement becomes normalized with the reality, reshapes its project according to the reality's conditions and limits, and integrates into its system instead of striving to change it, then its success in reaching power becomes a success for the movement as a political entity, not a success for Islam, whose banner it had raised.

And the true failure here lies not in losing elections, nor in losing parliamentary seats, nor in being removed from power; rather, it lies in contravening the foundation that Allah ﷻ established for Islam: that it be manifest, dominant, not subservient to another methodology, and not integrated into it.

Allah ﷻ said: **﴿هُوَ الَّذِي أَرْسَلَ رَسُولَهُ بِالْهُدَىٰ وَدِينِ الْحَقِّ لِيُظْهِرَهُ عَلَىٰ الدِّينِ كُلِّهِ ۚ وَكَفَىٰ بِاللَّهِ شَهِيدًا﴾** **“He is the One Who sent His Messenger with guidance and the Deen of truth, so that He may make it prevail over all religions. And sufficient is Allah as a Witness”** [TMQ Surah Al-Fath: 28]. Islam did not come to be a component within another system, nor to take its place within a framework that contradicts its fundamental principles and then call that a victory for it. Instead, it came to be the ultimate reference by which all methodologies and systems are measured, not to be the one that conforms to them.

Hence, the correct question when discussing the success of Islamic movements is not: Did they come to power? Nor: How many seats did they obtain? Nor: How many years did they

remain in authority? Rather, the question is: Did they preserve their ultimate objective? Did they proceed on their path according to the methodology of Islam? And was their arrival to power a step towards manifesting Islam, or was it an integration into a reality that managed to change them before they could change it?

Attaining power may be a victory for a movement, achieving a majority may be a political success, and forming a government may be a partisan accomplishment; but not every political success is a victory for Islam, just as not every political loss is a failure for the Islamic project. Herein lies the clarity of the distinction between the illusion of victory and the reality of failure.

The Concept of Holding Fast (اعتصام i'tasaam) to the Rope of Allah ﷻ

By: Ayman Salah – Palestine

Many preachers and individuals cite the saying of Allah ﷻ: ﴿وَأَعْتَصِمُوا بِحَبْلِ اللَّهِ جَمِيعًا وَلَا تَفَرَّقُوا﴾ **“And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided”** when urging unity, calling for the abandonment of factionalism, in reconciliation meetings between conflicting parties, and so on. These citations are correct in terms of the verse's indication, but often they do not grasp its full meaning, so they think that i'tisaam (اعتصام holding fast) is merely gathering together and not separating—and herein lies the error. For the verse calls for i'tisaam (وَأَعْتَصِمُوا) **“hold firmly”** and forbids separation (وَلَا تَفَرَّقُوا) **“and do not become divided”**. The command to hold fast to the rope of Allah ﷻ is the great command that encompasses much good, and gathering together and not separating is a part of it. To clarify this, it is necessary to explain the meaning of i'tisaam and the practical form of holding fast to the rope of Allah ﷻ upon which Muslims must be.

‘Ismah (عصمة) means protection (منى man’ah) in the sense of preservation and safeguarding, and i'tisaam (اعتصام) is to seek refuge or to be in a state of preservation and protection from evil. He ﷻ said: ﴿وَاللَّهُ يَعْصِمُكَ مِنَ النَّاسِ﴾ **“And Allah will protect you from the people”** [TMQ Surah Al-Ma’idah: 67], meaning He will prevent, protect, and preserve you from your enemies, so do not fear or grieve, for none of them will reach you with harm.

And He ﷻ said: ﴿قُلْ مَنْ ذَا الَّذِي يَعْصِمُكُم مِّنَ اللَّهِ إِنْ أَرَادَ بِكُمْ سُوءًا أَوْ أَرَادَ بِكُمْ رَحْمَةً﴾ **“Say, ‘Who is it that can protect you from Allah if He intends for you an evil or intends for you a mercy?’”** [TMQ Surah

Al-Ahzab: 17], meaning, who is it that can prevent you from Allah?

And He ﷺ said: قَالَ لَا عَاصِمَ الْيَوْمَ “He said, ‘I will take refuge on a mountain to protect me from the water.’ Nuh (as) said, ‘There is no protector today from the command of Allah except for whom He gives mercy.’” [TMQ Surah Hud: 43].

The word (يَعِصُمُنِي) “ya‘simuneen” means ‘protects me’ or ‘prevents it from reaching me’. This statement was on the tongue of the son of the Prophet of Allah, Nuh (as) when he thought that taking refuge on a mountain would prevent the water of the flood from reaching him and that no harm would befall him. The reply of Nuh (as) was: (لَا عَاصِمَ الْيَوْمَ مِنْ أَمْرِ اللَّهِ) “Laa ‘aasima al-yawma min amri Llaah” , meaning “There is no preventing protector today from the command of Allah” which He ﷺ decreed to drown all those who did not embark on the ship as believers with Nuh (as) and to destroy them.

From this also comes the concept of the ‘ismah (عصمة infallibility) of the Prophets, which means that Allah ﷻ has placed in the Prophets a divine faculty that prevents them from committing sin and inclining towards it, despite having the ability to do so. It is the protection of Allah ﷻ for His Prophets (as) and Messengers (as) from falling into major sins and transgressions, or from error in conveying the revelation, so that their proof remains sound and their call pure.

Thus, ‘Ismah (protection) is about providing a defense and safeguarding. In His ﷻ saying: ﴿وَاعْتَصِمُوا بِحَبْلِ اللَّهِ﴾ “**And hold firmly to the rope of Allah**” [TMQ Surah Aali ‘Imraan: 103], Allah ﷻ commands the believers to take the rope of Allah as a protection (عاصم ‘aasim) for them from the evils and dangers

they fear. The evils and dangers that may afflict the believers are many, including the aggression of the disbelievers and their violation of the believers' blood and lands; the internal strife and disagreements that tear them apart; the infiltration of false ideas and beliefs that lead them to disbelief and misguidance; and the seepage of the customs, behaviors, and lifestyles of the disbelievers into the Muslim society, leading to the corruption of their sons and women and the disintegration of their families.

The command of Allah ﷻ ﴿وَاَعْتَصِمُوا بِحَبْلِ اللَّهِ﴾ **“And hold firmly to the rope of Allah”** came after a warning against falling into disbelief after having believed, because the preceding verses were a warning against disbelief after Iman. Allah ﷻ said before it: ﴿يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِن تَطِيعُوا فَرِيقًا مِّنَ الَّذِينَ أُوتُوا الْكِتَابَ يَرُدُّوكُم بَعْدَ إِيمَانِكُمْ كَافِرِينَ * وَكَيْفَ تَكْفُرُونَ وَأَنْتُمْ تَتْلُوا عَلَى كُفْرِكُمْ آيَاتِ اللَّهِ وَفِيكُمْ رَسُولُهُ ۚ وَمَن يَعْتَصِم بِاللَّهِ فَقَدْ هُدِيَ إِلَى صِرَاطٍ مُّسْتَقِيمٍ * يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا اتَّقُوا اللَّهَ حَقَّ تَقَاتِهِ وَلَا تَمُوتُنَّ إِلَّا وَأَنْتُمْ مُسْلِمُونَ * وَاعْتَصِمُوا بِحَبْلِ اللَّهِ جَمِيعًا وَلَا تَفَرَّقُوا﴾ **“O you who have believed, if you obey a party of those who were given the Scripture, they would turn you back, after your belief, to being unbelievers. * And how could you disbelieve while the verses of Allah are recited to you and His Messenger is among you? And whoever holds firmly to Allah has [indeed] been guided to a straight path. * O you who have believed, fear Allah as He should be feared and do not die except as Muslims in submission to Him. * And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided.”** [TMQ Surah Aali ‘Imraan: 100-103].

Thus, in the first verse, Allah ﷻ forbids the believers from obeying any party from the People of the Book and clarifies that obeying them leads to disbelief. In the second verse, He admonishes the believers against reverting to disbelief by taking legislation from the People of the Book, while they have the Book

of Allah, in which guidance and light are recited to them, and among them is His Messenger to whom they can refer to solve any human problem that occurs. The verse also clarifies that whoever holds firmly to Allah, i.e., seeks protection and support in Allah, is upon a straight path. And the third verse urges them to fear Allah so that death does not come to them while they are in a state of disobedience or disbelief, which can occur through obeying the disbelievers. Then comes the verse of holding firmly (i'tisaam) to clarify for them the practical picture that protects the society and the Ummah from these evils. It explains that this practical picture entails two matters: first, holding firmly to the rope of Allah ﷻ, and second, being all together (jamee'an), meaning as a collective (al- jamaa'ah). So what is the rope of Allah that protects them? And what is the meaning of "all together" or "collective" that prevents them?

The word "rope" (حبل habl) is a polysemous (مُشْتَرَكٌ mushtarak) term with multiple meanings, some literal and some metaphorical.

Its original linguistic meaning is the means by which one reaches a desired goal or need. Among the literal meanings used by the Arabs for habl are: a tie or bond; something twisted from fibres or the like for tying or leading; the "rope of the shoulder" (حبل العاتق habl al-'aatiq), which is a ligament between the neck and the shoulder; and there is also the "rope of the jugular vein" (حبل الوريد habl al-wareed) and the "rope of the arm" (حبل الذراع habl al-dhiraa').

Among the metaphorical meanings of habl used by the Arabs is "covenant" or "pledge" ('ahd), as in His ﷻ saying: ﴿صُرِّبَتْ عَلَيْهِمُ الذَّلَّةُ أَيْنَ مَا ثِقِفُوا إِلَّا بِحَبْلِ مِّنَ اللَّهِ وَحَبْلٍ مِّنَ النَّاسِ﴾ **"Disgrace has been stamped upon them wherever they are found, except under a covenant from Allah and a covenant from the people"** [TMQ

Surah Aali Imran: 112] meaning, under a pledge and protection. And in the narration concerning the Ansar at the Pledge of Al-'Aqabah: (إِن بَيْنَنَا وَبَيْنَ الرِّجَالِ حَبَالٌ، وَإِنَّا قَاطِعُوهَا) "Verily, between us and the men are ropes, and we will cut them," meaning covenants and agreements.

In this verse, "the rope of Allah" (حبل الله habl Allah) refers to Allah's covenant or to the Noble Quran. Allah's covenant is that which Allah ﷻ has commanded to be fulfilled in His saying: ﴿يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا أَوْفُوا بِالْعُقُودِ﴾ **"O you who have believed, fulfill all contracts"** [TMQ Surah Al-Ma'idah: 1]. The "contracts" (al-'uqood) here are the covenants that Allah has made binding upon His servants. Every Muslim who testifies that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah has thereby accepted Allah's covenant and obligated himself to fulfill it. Its requirement is the application of the Shariah rulings that Allah has revealed in His Book, the Noble Quran, and the Sunnah of His Prophet ﷺ.

Some Quranic commentators (mufasirun) have said that the intended meaning of His saying: ﴿يَحْبِلِ اللَّهُ﴾ "to the rope of Allah" is the Quran, as the term "rope of Allah" has been used for the Quran in numerous hadiths. Among them is the hadith narrated by At-Tirmidhi from Al-Harith Al-A'war, from Ali (ra), marfu'an (attributed to the Prophet) regarding the description of the Quran: «هُوَ حَبْلُ اللَّهِ الْمَتِينُ، وَصِرَاطُهُ الْمُسْتَقِيمُ» **"It is the strong rope of Allah and His straight path."**

And from Abdullah ibn Mas'ud (ra) who said: The Prophet ﷺ said: «إِنَّ هَذَا الْقُرْآنَ مَادِبَةُ اللَّهِ فَاقْبَلُوا مَادِبَتَهُ مَا اسْتَطَعْتُمْ، إِنَّ هَذَا الْقُرْآنَ حَبْلُ اللَّهِ وَالنُّورِ الْمُبِينُ، وَالشِّفَاءُ النَّافِعُ، عَصَمُهُ لِمَنْ تَمَسَّكَ بِهِ، وَنَجَاةٌ لِمَنْ اتَّبَعَهُ، لَا يَزِيغُ فَيُسْتَعْتَبُ، وَلَا يَعْوجُّ فَيَقُومُ، وَلَا تَنْقُضِي عَجَائِبُهُ، وَلَا يَخْلُقُ مِنْ كَثَرَةِ الرَّدِّ» **"Indeed this Quran is the banquet of Allah, so accept His banquet as much as you are able. Verily, this Quran is the rope**

of Allah, the clear light, and the beneficial healing. It is a protection for whoever holds fast to it and a salvation for whoever follows it. It does not deviate so as to require correction, nor does it bend so as to be straightened. Its wonders do not cease, and it does not wear out from much repetition.” [Narrated by Al-Hakim in Al-Mustadrak ‘ala al-Sahihayn and Al-Bayhaqi in Shu’ab al-Iman. Al-Mundhiri said in At-Targhib wat-Tarhib: It is authentic (saheeh)].

In summary, “the rope of Allah,” upon whatever meaning it is understood, necessitates holding fast to the Book of Allah, the Noble Quran, which is the strong rope and the straight path.

Holding fast to the rope of Allah means that the Muslim takes protective refuge in Allah’s covenant and His Book, for it is what protects him and prevents him from falling into trials and misguidance. Clinging to the Book of Allah ﷻ means applying the Shariah rulings pertaining to the individual, the rulings pertaining to the al-jama’ah (الجماعة the community), and the rulings pertaining to the state. Thereby, the Book of Allah ﷻ, the Noble Quran, becomes the protecting safeguard against trials and evils—protecting the individual from the trials of disbelief, misguidance, and innovations; protecting the Ummah from any threat targeting the Ummah and the state; and protecting society from the infiltration of corrupt and deviant behavioral patterns that prevail in the societies of disbelief. The verse has clarified the practical form that must be embodied in the Islamic Ummah for this holding fast to be achieved and for protection from evils to be attained—namely, that they be “all together,” meaning as al-jama’ah (the unified community). This leads to an inquiry into the meaning of “al-jama’ah,” which is the second point in this research.

Allah ﷻ said: ﴿جميعا ولا تفرقوا﴾ “And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided” clarifies the practical form of the Ummah through which prevention and protection from every evil, trial, and aggression is achieved. As for “jamee’an” (جميعا - all together), it means a unified, gathered community. The meaning is: be unified in holding fast to it. And al-jama’ah (الجماعة the community) signifies the state of unification and the absence of division. Although the word “jamee’an” alone is sufficient to denote a single unified community, the verse emphasized this by prohibiting division ﴿ولا تفرقوا﴾ **“and do not become divided.”** Thus, the verse has commanded the believers that the community which unifies upon the covenant of Allah ﷻ and His Book, the Noble Quran, is their protection and safeguard against the evils of division, fragmentation, and their dangers, because division brings them every trial and evil and entices enemies against them.

Allah ﷻ has commanded the believers to be mutually affectionate and unified and has prohibited division, for division is destruction and unification is salvation, as stated in several Prophetic narrations, including the hadith of An-Nu‘man ibn Bashir, that the Prophet ﷺ said: «الجماعة رحمة والفرقة عذاب» **“The unified community (al-jama’ah) is mercy and division is torment”** (Narrated by Ahmad, At-Tabarani, and Al-Bayhaqi). And from ‘Umar (ra) who said: The Prophet ﷺ said: «من أراد بحبوبة الجنة فعليه بالجماعة» **“Whoever desires the spaciousness of Paradise, then let him adhere to the unified community (al-jama’ah)”** (Narrated by At-Tirmidhi, Ahmad, and An-Nasa’i).

The Shariah evidences in the Book of Allah ﷻ and the Sunnah of His Prophet ﷺ have detailed the Shariah vision of the al-jama’ah (الجماعة the community) through which protection from every evil is achieved. Its essence is that “al-jama’ah” is the Ummah, or a

part of the Ummah that has a single Imam or ruler for the Muslims at its head, who rules them by the Shariah rulings of Islam, receives the pledge of allegiance (bay'ah) from the Ummah, and obedience to him is obligatory.

Thus, the term al-jama'ah is a political term related to the state and its leadership. This term has a specific Shariah meaning clarified by the authentic ahadith, which explain that in the absence of the Imam or Khaleefah, the jama'ah does not exist. When the Ummah gives the pledge of allegiance to a Khaleefah, then the jama'ah comes into existence. As long as the Ummah has not pledged allegiance to an Imam or Khaleefah, al-jama'ah does not exist, and there is only disunity (furqah). Consequently, the term al-jama'ah has acquired a specific Shariah meaning—a Shariah reality. Therefore, wherever the term al-jama'ah, defined by the definite article "al-" (indicating a specific entity) or attached to the Muslims (in the form of "jama'at al-Muslimeen (جماعة المسلمين community of Muslims)" or "jama'at al-Mu'mineen (جماعة المؤمنين community of believers)" or "jama'atukum (جماعتكم your community)", appears in the Shariah texts, it denotes this Shariah reality and not the mere linguistic meaning.

In what follows, we mention the most important ahaadeeth that command adherence to the jama'ah or clarify its attributes, from which the Shariah meaning of the term al-jama'ah becomes clear:

Fadaalah ibn 'Ubayd reported that the Prophet ﷺ said: «ثَلَاثَةٌ لَا تَسْأَلُ عَنْهُمْ: رَجُلٌ فَارَقَ الْجَمَاعَةَ، وَعَصَى إِمَامَهُ، وَمَاتَ عَاصِيًا» **“Three people you should not ask about: a man who separates from al-jama'ah (the community), disobeys his Imam, and dies in a state of disobedience.”** (Narrated by Ahmad with a sound chain, and this wording is his; also by Al-Bazzaar and Ibn Hibbaan). And from Abu Hurayrah, from the Prophet ﷺ, that he said: «مَنْ خَرَجَ مِنَ الطَّاعَةِ

«وَفَارَقَ الْجَمَاعَةَ فَمَاتَ، مَاتَ مِيتَةً جَاهِلِيَّةً “Whoever abandons obedience and separates from al-jama’ah and dies, dies the death of the Jaahiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance).” (Narrated by Muslim, An-Nasaa’ee, Ibn Maajah, and Ahmad). The evidence in these two hadeeths is that the Messenger ﷺ considered the one who disobeys the Imam and abandons obedience to him as one who has separated from al-jama’ah. This means that al-jama’ah is the Ummah or a group from the Ummah that is headed by an Imam whose obedience is obligatory. Obedience is only obligatory to the Imam or the Khaleefah (Caliph) who implements the rulings of the Shariah. However, if there is a ruler who does not implement Islam, then he is not an Imam at all, and consequently, there is no jama’ah, because the Imamah (leadership) or the Khilaafah (Caliphate) is the general leadership for all Muslims in the world, for establishing the rulings of the Shariah domestically and carrying the Islamic Dawah externally. The 'ulema used to call the lands that were headed by the Imam or the Khaleefah, who had taken the pledge of allegiance (bay’ah), Daar al-‘Adl (the Abode of Justice), and they called the lands that were not under the authority of the legitimate Imam Daar al-Baghy (the Abode of Rebellion), even if their leader implemented Islam therein—so how about if the leader of rebellion implements the rulings of disbelief and the systems of disbelief?

And in the hadeeth of hudhayfah ibn al-Yamaan (ra) when he asked the Prophet ﷺ about evil and tribulations, it contained the statement of the Prophet ﷺ: «دُعَاةٌ إِلَى أَبْوَابِ جَهَنَّمَ، مَنْ أَجَابَهُمْ إِلَيْهَا ﷺ: قَدْ فُوه فِيهَا، قُلْتُ: يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ، صِفْهُمْ لَنَا؟ فَقَالَ: هُمْ مِنْ جِلْدَتِنَا، وَيَتَكَلَّمُونَ بِأَلْسِنَتِنَا، قُلْتُ: فَمَا تَأْمُرُنِي إِنْ أَدْرَكَنِي ذَلِكَ؟ قَالَ: تَلَزَمْ جَمَاعَةَ الْمُسْلِمِينَ وَإِمَامَهُمْ، قُلْتُ: فَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ لَهُمْ جَمَاعَةٌ وَلَا إِمَامٌ؟ قَالَ: فَاعْتَزِلْ تِلْكَ الْفِرْقَ كُلَّهَا، وَلَوْ أَنْ تَعْصُ «Callers to the gates of

Hellfire; whoever responds to them towards it, they will cast him into it.” I said: “O Messenger of Allah, describe them for us?” He said: “They are from our skin (i.e., of our origin/race) and speak with our tongues.” I said: “So what do you order me if I encounter that?” He said: “Adhere to al-jama’ah (the community) of the Muslims and their Imam.” I said: “And if there is no jama’ah for them and no Imam?” He said: “Then abandon all those factions, even if you have to bite onto the root of a tree, until death overtakes you while you are upon that.” (Narrated by Al-Bukhari and Muslim).

This hadeeth commands adherence to al-jama’ah of the Muslims and their Imam—thus it couples al-jama’ah with the Imam. Then Hudhayfah asks about the scenario where there is no jama’ah for the Muslims—which is the state of there being no Imam (**“if there is no jama’ah for them and no Imam”**). Hudhayfah’s question shows that the Companions (ra) understood that the Muslims are not in a jama’ah when they do not have a single Imam at their head. In such a case, they would be in a state of division into multiple states, and the gravest tribulation is that these states are led by “callers to the gates of Hellfire”—meaning rulers who do not apply Islam but rather apply the rules of disbelief (kufr), and who use their media and institutions to call for and promote the culture of disbelief in the lands of the Muslims. In this situation, the meaning of al-jama’ah does not apply to any of them.

And the understanding of the Companions (ra) was that the al-jama’ah (the community) does not exist unless the Ummah is unified upon an Imam or a Khaleefah. Ibn Katheer mentioned in his Taareekh that ‘Amr ibn Hurayth asked Sa’eed ibn Zayd (ra)—who was one of the ten promised Paradise—saying to him: “Did you witness the death of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ?” He said:

“Yes.” He asked him: “When was Abu Bakr given the pledge of allegiance?” Sa’eed said: “On the day the Messenger of Allah ﷺ died. The Muslims disliked to remain even part of a day without being in a Jama’ah.” The meaning of this is that the Companion Sa’eed ibn Zayd held the view that the Ummah is not in a Jama’ah except after pledging allegiance to an Imam. This is what ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭaab (ra) affirmed, as narrated by Tameem al-Daaree (ra), who said: People began building tall structures during the time of ‘Umar (ra), so ‘Umar said: **«يَا مَعْشَرَ الْعَرَبِ، الْأَرْضَ الْأَرْضَ، إِنَّهُ لَا إِسْلَامَ إِلَّا بِجَمَاعَةٍ، وَلَا جَمَاعَةٍ إِلَّا بِإِمَارَةٍ، وَلَا إِمَارَةٍ إِلَّا بِطَاعَةٍ»** “O company of Arabs, (stick to) the ground, the ground! Verily, there is no Islam except with al-jama’ah, and no jama’ah except with a leadership (Imaarah), and no leadership except with obedience.” Narrated by Al-Daarimee. This is also indicated by the consensus of the Muslims in the first century, as they named the year 41 AH “The Year of al-Jama’ah.” This was the year in which Al-hasan ibn ‘Alee—may Allah be pleased with them both—relinquished the Khilaafah to Mu’aawiyah ibn Abee Sufyaan, uniting their word upon Mu’aawiyah, and the Muslims thereby had a single Khaleefah. Prior to that, they had two Khulafā’, so they were not all one Jama’ah. May Allah have mercy on ‘Abdullaah ibn al-Mubaarak (who was from the Taabi’u at-Taabi’een, the ‘alim of his time, and the amir of the pious in his era) when he said:

إِنَّ الْجَمَاعَةَ حَبْلُ اللَّهِ فَاعْتَصِمُوا ... مِنْهُ بِعُرْوَتِهِ الْوُثْقَى لِمَنْ دَانَا

كَمْ يَدْفَعُ اللَّهُ بِالْسلْطَانِ مُعْضِلَةً ... فِي دِينِنَا رَحْمَةً مِنْهُ وَدُنْيَانَا

لَوْلَا الْخِلَافَةُ لَمْ تَأْمَنْ لَنَا سُبُلٌ ... وَكَانَ أَضْعَفُنَا نَهَبًا لِأَقْوَانَا

“Indeed, al-jama’ah is by the Rope of Allah, so hold fast ... to its firmest bond, for the one who submits to our Deen.

How much Allah resolves a predicament through the Sultan ... in our Deen as a mercy from Him and in our worldly life.

Were it not for the Khilafah, our roads would not be safe ... and the weakest among us would be prey for the strongest.”

Thus, the blameworthy division that Allah has prohibited in His saying, ﴿وَلَا تَفْرُقُوا﴾ **“and do not be divided”**, is the splitting of the Ummah into multiple entities and states. This meaning is established in the authentic ahadith that forbid the multiplicity of leaders (Imams) and prohibit Muslims from having more than one Khaleefah or more than one ruler:

It is narrated from Abu Hurayrah (ra) that the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, «إِنَّ اللَّهَ يَرْضَى لَكُمْ ثَلَاثًا، وَيَسْخَطُ لَكُمْ ثَلَاثًا: يَرْضَى لَكُمْ أَنْ تَعْبُدُوهُ وَلَا تُشْرِكُوا بِهِ شَيْئًا، وَأَنْ تَعْتَصِمُوا بِحَبْلِ اللَّهِ جَمِيعًا وَلَا تَفْرُقُوا، وَأَنْ تَنَاصَحُوا مَنْ وَلَّاهُ اللَّهُ أَمْرَكُمْ؛ وَيَسْخَطُ لَكُمْ ثَلَاثًا: قِيلَ وَقَالَ، وَكَثْرَةُ السُّؤَالِ، وَإِضَاعَةُ الْمَالِ» **“Indeed, Allah is pleased with three matters for you and is displeased with three things for you. He is pleased for you: that you worship Him and do not associate anything with Him, that you all hold fast to the rope of Allah and do not become divided, and that you give sincere advice to whom Allah has entrusted your affairs. And He is displeased with three things for you: gossip (he said, she said), asking too many questions, and squandering wealth.”** (Narrated by Muslim)

And it is narrated from ‘Arfajah ibn Shurayh (ra) that he said: I heard the Messenger of Allah ﷺ say, «مَنْ أَتَاكُمْ وَأَمْرُكُمْ جَمِيعٌ عَلَى رَجُلٍ، «وَاحِدٍ، يُرِيدُ أَنْ يَشُقَّ عَصَاكُمْ، أَوْ يَفَرِّقَ جَمَاعَتَكُمْ، فَاقْتُلُوهُ» **“Whoever comes to you while your affair is unified under one man, intending to split your unity or divide your community, then kill him.”** (Narrated by Muslim)

As for his ﷺ statement, «وَأَمْرُكُمْ جَمِيعٌ عَلَى رَجُلٍ وَاحِدٍ» **“while your affair is unified under one man,”** means: while you are a united

community (jama'ah) under one Imam (leader), agreed upon. So, whoever intends to divide this community, to split and sever the affair of this Ummah, and to appoint for it more than one Imam, then kill him. This is a prohibition against the Ummah having more than one Imam, meaning more than one state.

And from Abdullah ibn Amr ibn al-Aas (ra) that the Prophet ﷺ said, «وَمَنْ بَايَعَ إِمَامًا فَأَعْطَاهُ صَفَقَةَ يَدِهِ، وَثَمَرَةَ قَلْبِهِ، فَلَمْ يَطِعهُ إِلَّا اسْتَطَاعَ، فَإِنْ جَاءَ آخَرُ يُنَازِعُهُ فَأَضْرِبُوا عُنُقَ الْآخَرِ» **“Whoever pledges allegiance to an Imam, giving him the clasp of his hand and the fruit of his heart, then let him obey him if he is able. But if another comes to dispute (his authority), then strike the neck of the other.”** (Narrated by Muslim). From this hadith, we grasp the meaning of al-jama'ah (the unified community) which Allah has commanded us to hold fast to, and we realize the obligation of adhering to the al-jama'ah. We also understand that the punishment for whoever seeks to breach it, separate from it, or transgress against it is execution. This is because it is forbidden for any person to pledge allegiance for the Khilafah after the Khilafah has been established for a Khaleefah, even if the second is better than the first, and for this reason, he is ordered to be killed.

This hadith is narrated at length by Muslim, wherein he mentioned at its beginning the trials, tribulations, and reprehensible matters that can occur in the absence of al-jama'ah, then he commanded fulfilling the pledge of allegiance to the Khaleefah and obeying him. Abdullah ibn Amr (ra) said: We were with the Messenger of Allah ﷺ on a journey, and we stopped at a place. Among us were those fixing their tents, those practicing archery, and those tending to their camels, when the caller of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ called out: “As-Salatu jami'ah” (Salah in congregation). So we gathered to the Messenger of Allah ﷺ, and he said: «إِنَّهُ لَمْ يَكُنْ نَبِيٌّ قَبْلِي إِلَّا كَانَ حَقًّا عَلَيْهِ أَنْ يَدُلَّ أُمَّتُهُ

عَلَى خَيْرِ مَا يَعْلَمُهُ لَهُمْ، وَيُنْذِرُهُمْ شَرَّ مَا يَعْلَمُهُ لَهُمْ، وَإِنَّ أَمَّتَكُمْ هَذِهِ جُعِلَ عَافِيَتُهَا فِي أَوَّلِهَا، وَسَيُصِيبُ آخِرَهَا بَلَاءٌ وَأُمُورٌ تُنْكَرُونَهَا، وَتَجِيءُ فِتْنَتُهُ يُرْفَقُ بَعْضُهَا بَعْضًا، وَتَجِيءُ الْفِتْنَةُ فَيَقُولُ الْمُؤْمِنُ: هَذِهِ مُهْلِكَتِي، ثُمَّ تَنْكَشِفُ، وَتَجِيءُ الْفِتْنَةُ فَيَقُولُ الْمُؤْمِنُ: هَذِهِ هَذِهِ. فَمَنْ أَحَبَّ أَنْ يُرْحَلَ عَنِ النَّارِ، وَيَدْخُلَ الْجَنَّةَ، فَلَتَاتِهِ مَيِّتُهُ وَهُوَ يُؤْمِنُ بِاللَّهِ وَالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ، وَلَيَأْتِ إِلَى النَّاسِ الَّذِي يُحِبُّ أَنْ يُوتَى إِلَيْهِ، وَمَنْ بَايَعَ إِمَامًا فَأَعْطَاهُ صَفَقَةً يَدِهِ، وَثَمَرَةً قَلْبِهِ، فَلْيُطِعه إِنْ اسْتَطَاعَ، فَإِنْ جَاءَ آخَرُ يُنَازِعُهُ «There was no Prophet (as) before me except that it was incumbent upon him to guide his Ummah to the best of what he knew for them and to warn them against the worst of what he knew for them. Indeed, your Ummah has had its well-being placed in its beginning, and its end will be struck by tribulation and matters you will deny. There will come trials that will thin one another out. A trial will come and the believer will say, 'This will be my destruction,' then it will be lifted. Then another trial will come and the believer will say, 'This one, this one.' So whoever loves to be saved from the Fire and to enter Paradise, then let death come to him while he believes in Allah and the Last Day, and let him come to the people with that which he loves to be done to him. And whoever pledges allegiance to an Imam, giving him the clasp of his hand and the fruit of his heart, then let him obey him if he is able. But if another comes to dispute his authority, then strike the neck of the other.” (Narrated by Muslim).

Therefore, the hadith guides that holding firmly to the unification of the Ummah and protection from tribulations and ordeals—some of which make others seem lighter—and the reprehensible matters through which people are destroyed, is achieved by not permitting the Ummah to have more than one state and one Imam. So, whoever comes and wants to become a Khaleefah (Caliph) and establish a state for the people after the Ummah already has a state and a Khaleefah who has been pledged

allegiance to rule by the Book of Allah ﷻ, the Noble Quran, and the Sunnah of His Prophet ﷺ, must be repelled, even by killing if the situation requires it, whoever he may be. And if a pledge of allegiance is given to a second Khaleefah and a second state is established that contends with al-jama'ah and the first state, then it will become a gateway to tribulations and ordeals, and a gateway to tribulations that make each other seem lighter, as a result of disunity and the absence of al-. And the hadith was speaking about the Ummah in this time, where there is no Imam over them ruling by Islam; rather, there are dozens of rulers and separate states. This has caused the Ummah to lose its dignity, increased its humiliation in the world, and allowed the disbelievers to dominate it from every side, violating the sanctity of blood and lands in the east and west of the Muslim lands.

And holding firmly to the rope of Allah by establishing al-jama'ah (the community) headed by an Imam who applies the Shariah is the characteristic of the saved sect (al-firqah an-naajiyah) mentioned in the hadeeth of division (افتراق iftiraaq). This is a hadeeth in which the Prophet ﷺ warns against disunity (التفرق at-tafarruq), which is the opposite of unification (al-jama'ah). The hadeeth has been narrated through several chains (riwaayaat), none of which are free from weakness in their chain of transmission (sanad). Some of its narrations—perhaps among the best in terms of chain—are those that mention “al-jama'ah” as the attribute of the saved sect. The wording of the hadeeth is: «أَلَا إِنَّ مَنْ قَبْلَكُمْ مِنْ أَهْلِ الْكِتَابِ افْتَرَقُوا عَلَى ثِنْتَيْنِ وَسَبْعِينَ مِلَّةً، وَإِنَّ هَذِهِ الْمِلَّةَ سَتَفْتَرِقُ عَلَى ثَلَاثٍ وَسَبْعِينَ، ثِنْتَانِ وَسَبْعُونَ فِي النَّارِ، وَوَاحِدَةٌ فِي الْجَنَّةِ، وَهِيَ **«Indeed, those before you from the People of the Book split into seventy-two sects, and this Ummah will split into seventy-three sects; seventy-two are in the Fire, and one is in Paradise, and it is al-jama'ah.»** In another narration, it is said:

«كُلُّهَا فِي النَّارِ إِلَّا وَاحِدَةً» **“...all of them are in the Fire except one.”** It was asked: “Who are they, O Messenger of Allah?” He said: **«مَا أَنَا عَلَيْهِ وَأَصْحَابِي»** **“That which I and my Companions are upon.”** It was narrated by Imam Ahmad, Abu Daawood, At-Tirmidhee, Ibn Maajah, and Al-haakim.

And this hadeeth of division (al-iftiraaq) and the saved sect (الفرقة الناجية al-firqah an-naajiyah) is not from the clearly authentic, rigorously established (saheeh) hadeeths, nor is it from those whose authenticity has become manifest and widespread among the Imams of hadeeth preservation (al-a’immah al-huffaaz). There is indeed a difference of opinion among the huffaaz regarding its established textual authentication (thuboot). Some of them lean towards weakening it (taḍ’eef) due to various aspects, while others lean towards strengthening it (taqweet), and this latter view is the more famous and apparent one among the later huffaaz. This hadeeth has been narrated from the reports of Abu Hurayrah, Anas ibn Maalik, ‘Abdullaah ibn ‘Umar, and Mu’aawiyah ibn Abee Sufyaan—that is, from a group of the Companions—from the Prophet ﷺ. The greatest issue lies in the addition (az-ziyaadah) that came in some narrations, which is his statement: **«كُلُّهَا فِي النَّارِ إِلَّا وَاحِدَةً»** **“All of them are in the Fire except one.”** Ibn Hazm and a group went so far as to reject it (aṭ-ṭa’nfeeh), while Ibn Taymiyyah and a group went towards strengthening it. It should be known that the Imams of jurisprudence and fundamentals of fiqh (أئمة الفقه والأصول al-a’immah al-fiqh wal-usool) who accepted the hadeeth with the phrase **«كُلُّهَا فِي النَّارِ إِلَّا وَاحِدَةً»** **“All of them are in the Fire except one”** did not understand it according to its apparent, literal meaning that occurs to the minds of the common people—namely, that it implies declaring Muslims as disbelievers (at-takfeer) and eternal damnation in the Fire. Instead, they considered it a threat

(wa‘eed) directed at acts of disobedience and innovation (‘isyaan wa-bid‘ah).

Here, there is a matter that must be taken into consideration in our research: it is not important to arrive at a definitive conclusion regarding the authenticity of this hadeeth or its lack thereof. For reaching such a certainty does not yield a decisive result in establishing the issues intended in this research, because division is a reality within the Ummah today, and there is no scope for bypassing or denying it, even if the Prophet ﷺ had not informed us of it.

And the hadeeth does not specify the time when this division occurs. Therefore, scholars in every historical period have considered division to be present in their own era. Some attempted to enumerate the sects, with some viewing any difference of opinion as constituting a sect, thereby reaching a number of around seventy. Others considered that the number was only meant to indicate multiplicity. This reflects their differing understandings of the concept of division (tafarruq). Most of them viewed division as the existence of innovations, ideas, schools of thought, and groups. And since the hadeeth clarifies that the saved sect (al-firqah an-naajiyah) is al-jama‘ah, some ‘ulema interpreted al-jama‘ah as the great majority (as-sawaad al-a‘zam) and the general body of the Ummah. Given that the hadeeth speaks about the division of the Ummah of Muhammad ﷺ and does not refer to groups that have left Islam—as they are not part of the Ummah—it is not necessary to say that al-jama‘ah, which is the saved sect, implies that the other sects are disbelievers. Instead, they are sinful for their departure from the Imam. This is why the ‘ulema of the Sunnah did not declare most of the theological and political sects that proliferated in various periods as disbelievers, as Ahl as-Sunnah

constituted the great majority. This interpretation was correct in the early centuries when the Imam of al-jama'ah was from Ahl as-Sunnah.

And it has been clarified that “al-jama'ah” is the Ummah under a single Imam, and that division (tafarruq) is the existence of more than one Imam or leader for the Muslims. It appears that this understanding is what led Muslims in the early eras to use the term “Ahl as-Sunnah” (People of the Sunnah) and not “Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jama'ah” (People of the Sunnah and the Community) to denote the largest body of Muslims, which stood in contrast to the proponents of theological schools (kalaam) such as the Mu'tazilah, the Jabriyyah, and the Qadariyyah, or in contrast to political groups like the Imamiyyah and the Zaydiyyah. In the era when theological schools became widespread, the Khaleefah (Caliph) and the state adopted the theological opinions of those factions. It is known that a number of Abbasid caliphs adopted Mu'tazilite views on theological issues. Thus, the leadership of the Ummah or the Khaleefah (Caliph) was not in the hands of “Ahl as-Sunnah”; Ahl as-Sunnah were a part of al-jama'ah but not its Imams. However, after the Caliphs retracted their opinions, abandoned the views of the Mu'tazilah, and adopted the opinions of “Ahl as-Sunnah,” people began using the term “Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jama'ah,” because the leadership of al-jama'ah, or the Khilafah (Caliphate), had come into the hands of those who adopted the opinions of Ahl as-Sunnah. Ahl as-Sunnah thus became the ruling representatives of al-jama'ah. Consequently, the use of the term “Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jama'ah” began at a later time, and it is most likely that the Ash'arees were the first to employ this term.

Upon examining the reality of the Ummah today, we find that the division (tafarruq) which stands in opposition to the political and

legal concept of al-jama‘ah is clearly present. This is manifested by the existence of Muslims within dozens of political entities and their failure to unite under a single Imam or Khaleefah. In fact, there is no Imam or Khaleefah for the Muslims at all, because no leader in any entity has been pledged allegiance to for ruling by Islam—whether he is called a president, a king, an emir, a Wali al-Faqeeh (Guardian Jurist), the head of a movement, or anything else. Muslims today are not in a state of al-jama‘ah, and the al-jama‘ah—in its political-legal sense—does not exist in any of these entities.

Given that Muslims are divided into more than seventy entities or quasi-entities today—including 57 states that are members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, in addition to the existence of about twenty separatist entities or quasi-entities within these states and in other countries—the image of division mentioned in the hadeeth about splitting into sects is clearly evident in the Ummah today. Therefore, it is absurd today to apply the term al-jama‘ah to any group in any country due to the absence of al-jama‘ah. The correct designation is to say only “Ahl as-Sunnah” (People of the Sunnah).

And since the hadeeth of the saved sect (Al-Firqah An-Naajiyah) clarifies that the saved sect is al-jama‘ah, it aligns with the verse of holding fast: ﴿وَأَعْتَصِمُوا بِحَبْلِ اللَّهِ جَمِيعًا وَلَا تَفَرَّقُوا﴾ **“And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided”** [TMQ Surah Aali ‘Imraan: 103]. This verse clarifies that salvation and protection from various tribulations, and from the domination or aggression of the disbelievers against the Ummah, is achieved by holding fast to the rope of Allah through establishing a jama‘ah headed by an Imam who applies the Shariah. This concept also aligns with the authentic hadeeth: «وَأِنَّمَا الْإِمَامُ جُنَّةٌ يُقَاتَلُ مِنْ وَرَائِهِ وَيَتَّقَى بِهِ» **“Indeed, the Imam is a**

shield; fighting is done behind him and he provides protection.”
[Narrated by Al-Bukhari and Muslim from Abu Hurayrah (ra)]. It likewise aligns with the ahaadeeth that prohibit the multiplicity of Imams (Shariah rulers of the community).

And if the Companions (ra) disliked remaining even part of a day without being in a jama‘ah after the death of the Prophet ﷺ, and thus hastened to pledge allegiance to a Khaleefah until they unified upon pledging allegiance to Abu Bakr (ra), then it is all the more fitting for Muslims today that their paramount cause be the establishment of al-jama‘ah and working to install a single Imam and Khaleefah to rule by the Book of Allah ﷻ and the Sunnah of His Messenger ﷺ. For they profess one Deen, worship one Lord ﷻ, their Messenger ﷺ is one, and their Book is one. And only through this will they attain inviolability and holding fast to the rope of Allah ﷻ, and their might and status among the peoples will be restored.

The Right to Residential Accommodation in Islamic Shariah

Ahmad Al-Ameen – Iraq

First: The Right to Housing in Islamic Shariah

The right to housing is one of the most important economic and societal rights of a human being, as providing adequate housing is an essential element in guaranteeing human dignity. A home is a fundamental necessity for a healthy, decent life. The meaning of sakan (housing) linguistically: “to dwell within” (سَكَنَ sakana) an abode; and As-Sakeenah (السَّكِينَةُ) is domestic tranquility and dignity; and “Sakana (سَكَنَ)” in his home, means he dwells in it; he resided in a place: he settled and inhabited it, as in “he used to reside in the countryside.” Allah ﷻ said: ﴿وَإِذْ قِيلَ لَهُمْ اسْكُنُوا هَذِهِ الْقَرْيَةَ﴾ **“And when it was said to them, ‘Dwell in this city’”** [TMQ Surah Al-A'raf: 161]. As for “askanahu fil makaan” (أَسْكَنَهُ فِي الْمَكَانِ) is he caused someone to reside in a place: he made him dwell there or settle and inhabit it, as in (أَسْكَنْتُ أَخِي فِي مَنْزِلِي) “I housed my brother in my home.” Allah ﷻ said: ﴿رَبَّنَا إِنِّي أَسْكَنْتُ مِنْ ذُرِّيَّتِي بِوَادٍ غَيْرِ ذِي زَرْعٍ﴾ **“Our Lord, I have settled some of my descendants in an uncultivated valley”** [TMQ Surah Ibrahim: 37]. A dwelling is also called a house (بيت bayt), as Allah ﷻ said: ﴿وَاللَّهُ جَعَلَ لَكُمْ مِنْ بُيُوتِكُمْ سَكَنًا﴾ **“And Allah has made for you from your homes a place of rest”** [TMQ Surah An-Nahl: 80].

Secondly: Defining the Right to Housing Terminologically:

Accommodation (مسكن maskan) refers to the house in which a person resides, whether permanently or temporarily. It is the natural place to which a person retreats to shelter from the summer heat, the winter cold, and the gaze of passersby. It is the

place of his secrets and the abode of his family. Undoubtedly, the human need for shelter is among the fundamental necessities of life and is one of the blessings (نعم ni'am) of Allah ﷻ upon mankind. Allah ﷻ says: ﴿وَاللَّهُ جَعَلَ لَكُم مِّن بُيُوتِكُمْ سَكَنًا وَجَعَلَ لَكُم مِّنْ أَصْوَابِهَا وَأَوْبَارِهَا جُلُودَ الْاَنْعَامِ بُيُوتًا تَسْتَخِفُّونَهَا يَوْمَ ظَعْنِكُمْ وَيَوْمَ إِقَامَتِكُمْ وَمِنْ أَصْوَابِهَا وَأَوْبَارِهَا أَثَاثًا وَمَتَاعًا إِلَىٰ حِينٍ﴾ “And Allah has made for you from your homes a place of rest and made for you from the hides of the cattle dwellings (tents) which you find light to carry on the day of your travel and the day of your encampment; and from their wool, fur, and hair is furnishing and enjoyment for a time” [TMQ Surah An-Nahl: 80].

The meaning of His ﷻ statement, ﴿جَعَلَ لَكُم﴾ “made for you,” signifies “He rendered” or “He made to be.” Everything that covers you from above, providing shade, is a roof or a sky; everything that carries you from below is ground; and everything that screens you from your four directions is a wall. When these elements are organized and connected, they form a house. This verse enumerates the blessings of Allah ﷻ upon people regarding houses. It first mentions the houses of cities, which are for long-term residence.

His statement, ﴿سَكَنًا﴾ “a place of rest,” means you find rest therein and your limbs find relief from movement, though you may move within it and find rest elsewhere; however, the statement is made according to the predominant case. Thus, the Blessed and Exalted mentions the completeness of His blessings upon His servants by what He has made for them of houses that are a resting place for them. They retreat to them, seek privacy within them, and benefit from them in all manners of benefit. That is, Allah ﷻ has made houses, of whatever type, a place of rest to which people return, where they feel comfort and are secure regarding their private parts and their sanctities.

Secondly: The Importance of the Right to Housing

Providing adequate housing occupies the pinnacle of the hierarchy of essential human priorities in any society. It is no less important than a person's need for food and drink, and it is necessary for achieving societal stability through which an individual can perform his expected role in society. Therefore, adequate housing is considered one of the fundamental human rights. Allah ﷻ has said: ﴿وَلَقَدْ كَرَّمْنَا بَنِي آدَمَ وَحَمَلْنَاهُمْ فِي الْبَرِّ وَالْبَحْرِ وَرَزَقْنَاهُمْ مِنَ الطَّيِّبَاتِ وَفَضَّلْنَاهُمْ عَلَى كَثِيرٍ مِمَّنْ خَلَقْنَا تَفْضِيلًا﴾ **“And We have certainly honored the children of Aadam (as) and carried them on the land and sea and provided for them of the good things and preferred them over much of what We have created, with definite preference”** [TMQ Surah Al-Israa': 70].

Islam preserves for man the right to housing; indeed, it guarantees him security within his home because it is his refuge, the repository of his secrets, and the place of his comfort and peace of mind. Housing is among the fundamental matters for ensuring a dignified life, protecting him from the adversities of the universe such as the heat of summer and the cold of winter. Islam has guaranteed this right to all inhabitants of the Islamic state—both Muslims and Ahl al-Dhimmah (أهل الذمة non-Muslim citizens)—securing that right for every individual among the Ahl al-Dhimmah just as it secures it for every individual among the Muslims. Every human being has the right to housing, whether through ownership, renting, or donation—even if it is an endowment (وقف waqf), such as a shelter for a wayfarer (ابن سبيل ibn as-sabeel), or a masjid for someone in dire need; for the People of the Suffah (أهل الصفة Ahl as-Suffah) took the Al-Masjid An-Nabbawi as a temporary residence due to their poverty and the inability of the Bayt al-Mal (بيت المال state treasury) to provide housing for them. It is not permissible to leave a family or an

individual without shelter in a home, because that would lead to harm to his self, his wealth, his worship, and his honor, and it would cause hardship for him and those with him from his family. Warding off harm from him is obligatory, and the obligation falls upon him first to ward off that harm from himself and his dependents by owning a home, or by renting it, or by obtaining it through donation. If he is unable, then the obligation becomes incumbent upon the state to shelter him and his family, and it is a collective obligation of sufficiency (فرض كفاية fard kifayah) upon the society, and they all incur sin by neglecting it.

To preserve this right, Islamic Shariah has established the inviolability of the home for every individual under its sovereignty. If an individual possesses a home, it is impermissible for anyone to violate the sanctity of that home. Indeed, no one may enter a home except with the permission of its owner. Allah ﷻ says, ﴿يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا لَا تَدْخُلُوا بُيُوتًا غَيْرَ بُيُوتِكُمْ حَتَّى تَسْتَأْذِنُوا وَتُسَلِّمُوا﴾ ﷻ says, **“O you who have believed, do not enter houses other than your own houses until you ascertain welcome and greet their inhabitants. That is best for you; perhaps you will be reminded”** [TMQ Surah An-Nur: 27]. And Abu Sa'id al-Khudri (ra) reported that the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, **«مَنْ اسْتَأْذَنَ ثَلَاثًا فَلَمْ يُؤْذَنْ لَهُ، فَلْيَرْجِعْ»** **“If someone seeks permission three times and is not granted permission, then let him turn back.”**

Third: The Role of the State in Islam in Securing Housing

Islam is the only Deen that has established fundamental rules encompassing all aspects of human life—not merely the material aspects. It comprehensively and interconnectedly regulates spiritual, moral, social, political, and economic dimensions, thereby ensuring that a society which adopts the Islamic 'Aqeedah (creed) and conduct attains happiness, tranquility in

life, and achieves the required economic and social progress. In the economic sphere, Islam has laid down rules and guaranteed rights, coupling them with regulations and limits. Islam guarantees for each and every individual the satisfaction of the essential needs that a human being, by virtue of being human, must fulfill—namely food, clothing, and shelter—and it urges the individual to enjoy the good things and to take from the adornments of this world to the extent of his ability. Thus, it secures the right to live for every single person and affords him prosperity in life.

The role of the State in Islam is to care for the interests of the people, in accordance with the Hadith of the Prophet ﷺ who said: **«كُلُّكُمْ رَاعٍ، وَكُلُّكُمْ مَسْئُولٌ، فَأَلَامِيرُ الَّذِي عَلَى النَّاسِ رَاعٍ، وَهُوَ مَسْئُولٌ عَنْ رَعِيَّتِهِ، وَالرَّجُلُ رَاعٍ عَلَى أَهْلِ بَيْتِهِ، وَهُوَ مَسْئُولٌ، وَالْمَرْأَةُ رَاعِيَةٌ عَلَى بَيْتِ رَوْحِهَا، وَهِيَ مَسْئُولَةٌ، وَالْعَبْدُ رَاعٍ عَلَى مَالِ سَيِّدِهِ، وَهُوَ مَسْئُولٌ، أَلَا فِكُلُّكُمْ رَاعٍ، وَكُلُّكُمْ مَسْئُولٌ»** **“Every one of you is a guardian and is responsible for those under his care. The ruler who has authority over people is a guardian and is responsible for his subjects; a man is a guardian over his family and is responsible; a woman is a guardian over her husband’s house and is responsible; a servant is a guardian over his master’s property and is responsible. So all of you are guardians and are responsible for your charge.”**

The state bears the responsibility of providing housing for every one of its citizens. Therefore, Islamic Shariah has established the right to housing for all individuals of the state. Every person has a right to housing, whether through ownership, rental, or donation, and they have been granted the right to build, own, and rent out housing to others.

And among the historical evidences for this is what was mentioned regarding the Khaleefah (Caliph) Umar ibn Abdul Azeez—may Allah have mercy upon him—that he wrote to his

governors: (أن اقضوا عن الغارمين) “Settle the debts of those in debt (al-gharimeen).” They wrote back to him: (إننا نجد الرجل له المسكن) “We find that a man has a home and a servant, and he has a horse, and he has furnishings in his house.” Umar wrote back: (لأبد للرجل من المسلمين من مسكن يأوي إليه رأسه، وخادم يكفيه مهنته، وفرس يجاهد عليه عدوه، وأثاث في بيته، ومع ذلك فهو غارم، فاقضوا عنه ما عليه من الدين) “A Muslim man must have a home to shelter his head, a servant to handle his chores for him, a horse to wage jihad against his enemy upon, and furnishings in his home. And over that, he is in debt, so settle the debt he owes.”

In this report, the Amir of the Believers, Umar, orders the settling of debts for those in debt even if they own a home, furnishings, a servant, and a horse. This is a great manifestation of mercy, compassion, and concern for the affairs of the subjects. And thus do the just rulers handle the wealth of the Ummah—they enrich its poor with it, mend its broken with it, free its captive with it, settle the debts of its insolvent with it, and fill the need of its destitute with it.

Indeed, the role and concern of the state for the interests of the people extended even further than that. The state would even undertake the repair of a wall of a house in a distant province for one of its subjects. Among the narrations about the Khaleefah (Caliph) Umar ibn Abdul Azeez—may Allah have mercy upon him—is that he used to follow up on the affairs of the Muslims and open the doors wide to hear their news. The postal courier of Umar ibn Abdul Azeez would not be given to anyone if he had a letter to deliver except that he would carry it. A courier departed from Egypt, and a black slave woman named Fartunah, the maidservant of Dhi Asbah, handed him a letter. In it, she mentioned that she had a low wall, and that people would

breach it and steal her chickens. He wrote back: (بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم، من عبد الله أمير المؤمنين إلى فرتونة السوداء مولاة ذي أصبح، بلغني كتابك وما ذكرت من قصر حائطك وأنه يُدخل عليك فيُسرق دجاجك، فقد كتبتُ كتاباً إلى أيوب بن شرحبيل – وكان أيوب عامله على صلاة مصر وحربها – أمره بأن يبني لك “In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. From the servant of Allah, the Commander of the Believers, to Fartunah the Black, the maidservant of Dhi Asbah. Your letter has reached me, and I have noted what you mentioned about the shortness of your wall and that people enter through it to steal your chickens. I have written a letter to Ayyub bin Sharhabeel”—and Ayyub was his governor in charge of the Deen and military affairs of Egypt— “ordering him to build it for you and fortify it for you against what you fear, Allah willing.” And he wrote to Ayyub bin Sharhabeel: (من عبد الله عمر أمير المؤمنين إلى ابن شرحبيل، أما بعد: فإن فرتونة مولاة ذي أصبح كتبت تذكرك قصر حائطها، وأنه يُسرق منه دجاجها وتساءل تحصينه لها، فإذا جاءك كتابي هذا “From the servant of Allah, Umar, the Commander of the Believers, to Ibn Sharhabeel. To proceed: Fartunah, the maidservant of Dhi Asbah, has written mentioning the shortness of her wall and that her chickens are stolen from it, and she asks for it to be fortified for her. So, when this letter of mine reaches you, ride out yourself to it until you have fortified it for her.” When the letter reached Ayyub, he rode in person until he came to Giza, asking about Fartunah until he found her. She was a poor black woman. He informed her of what the Amir of the Believers had written and fortified the wall for her.

And if the state, with its various resources, is unable to guarantee this right for its needy subjects, then the responsibility falls upon the wealthy in society. It is incumbent upon them to fulfill the needs of the poor and needy for food, drink, clothing,

and shelter. Ibn Hazm al-Andalusi—may Allah have mercy upon him—said: (وَفُرِضَ عَلَى الْأَعْنِيَاءِ مِنْ أَهْلِ كُلِّ بَلَدٍ أَنْ يَقُومُوا بِفُقَرَائِهِمْ، وَيُجِيرُهُمْ السُّلْطَانُ عَلَى ذَلِكَ، إِنْ لَمْ تَقُمْ الزَّكَّوَاتُ بِهِمْ، وَلَا فِي سَائِرِ أَمْوَالِ الْمُسْلِمِينَ، فَيَقَامَ لَهُمْ بِمَا يَأْكُلُونَ مِنَ الْقُوتِ الَّذِي لَا بُدَّ مِنْهُ، وَمِنْ اللَّبَاسِ لِلشَّتَاءِ وَالصَّيْفِ بِمِثْلِ ذَلِكَ، وَيَمَسْكُنُ بَكُنُوتِهِمْ مِنَ الْمَطَرِ، وَالصَّيْفِ وَالشَّمْسِ، وَعُيُونُ الْمَرَّةِ. وَبُزْهَانُ ذَلِكَ: قَوْلُ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى: ﴿فَاتِّبِ ذَا الْقُرْبَىٰ حَقَّهُ وَالْمَسْكِينِ وَابْنَ السَّبِيلِ﴾، وَقَالَ تَعَالَى: ﴿وَبِالْوَالِدَيْنِ إِحْسَانًا وَبِذِي الْقُرْبَىٰ وَالْيَتَامَىٰ وَالْمَسْكِينِ وَالْجَارِ ذِي الْقُرْبَىٰ وَالْجَارِ الْجُنُبِ وَالصَّاحِبِ بِالْجَنبِ وَابْنِ السَّبِيلِ وَمَا مَلَكَتْ أَيْمَانُكُمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُحِبُّ مَنْ كَانَ مُخْتَالًا فَخُورًا﴾، فَأَوْجَبَ تَعَالَىٰ حَقَّ الْمَسَاكِينِ، وَابْنِ السَّبِيلِ، وَمَا مَلَكَتِ الْيَمِينُ مَعَ حَقِّ ذِي الْقُرْبَىٰ وَافْتَرَضَ الْإِحْسَانَ إِلَى الْأَبْوَيْنِ، وَذِي الْقُرْبَىٰ، وَالْمَسَاكِينِ، وَالْجَارِ، وَمَا مَلَكَتِ الْيَمِينُ، وَالْإِحْسَانُ يَفْتَضِي كُلَّ مَا ذَكَرْنَا، وَمَنْعُهُ إِسَاءَةٌ بِلَا شَكٍّ) “It is obligatory upon the wealthy people of every locality to provide for their poor, and the Sultan (ruler) must compel them to do so if the Zakat funds are insufficient for them, nor are there sufficient funds in the general wealth of the Muslims. They must be provided with the necessary sustenance they require to eat, clothing for winter and summer of a similar standard, and a dwelling that shelters them from rain, summer heat, sun, and the eyes of passersby. The proof for this is the statement of Allah the Exalted: ﴿فَاتِّبِ ذَا الْقُرْبَىٰ حَقَّهُ وَالْمَسْكِينِ وَابْنَ السَّبِيلِ﴾ “So give the relative his right, and [also] the poor and the traveler” [TMQ Surah Al-Israa’: 26], and He the Exalted said: ﴿وَبِالْوَالِدَيْنِ إِحْسَانًا وَبِذِي الْقُرْبَىٰ وَالْيَتَامَىٰ وَالْمَسْكِينِ وَالْجَارِ ذِي الْقُرْبَىٰ وَالْجَارِ الْجُنُبِ وَالصَّاحِبِ بِالْجَنبِ وَابْنِ السَّبِيلِ وَمَا مَلَكَتْ أَيْمَانُكُمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُحِبُّ مَنْ كَانَ مُخْتَالًا فَخُورًا﴾ “And do good to parents, relatives, orphans, the needy, the near neighbor, the distant neighbor, the companion at your side, the traveler, and those whom your right hands possess. Indeed, Allah does not like those who are self-deluding and boastful” [TMQ Surah An-Nisaa’: 36]. Thus, the Exalted made obligatory the rights of the poor, the traveler, and those whom your right hands possess, along with the right of the relative, and He made obligatory kindness to parents and relatives, the poor, the

neighbor, and those whom your right hands possess. And kindness necessitates all that we have mentioned, and withholding it is undoubtedly wrongdoing."

And it is an individual obligation (فرض عين fard 'ayn) upon every capable Muslim who has surplus housing and becomes aware of a family without a home to shelter them, provided no one else has undertaken this responsibility. This sheltering should be for a temporary period to avert the harm of destitution, because making it permanent would cause harm to the benefactor—unless he consents to it, or the state of destitution persists for those he sheltered and his capacity to shelter them continues. This is because such a person is considered as an Ibn as-Sabeel (ابن سبيل a wayfarer), and a wayfarer's need is temporary, not permanent. This applies whether this individual or family agrees with us in Deen or disagrees, because repelling actual or anticipated harm from persons, honor, and wealth is an absolute obligation not restricted to those who agree in Deen. This is due to the generality of Allah's saying, ﴿إِنَّ اللَّهَ يَأْمُرُ بِالْعَدْلِ وَالْإِحْسَانِ وَإِيتَاءِ ذِي الْقُرْبَىٰ وَيَنْهَىٰ عَنِ الْفَحْشَاءِ وَالْمُنْكَرِ وَالْبَغْيِ يَعِظُكُم لَعَلَّكُمْ تَذَكَّرُونَ﴾ **"Indeed, Allah orders justice and good conduct and giving to relatives and forbids immorality and bad conduct and oppression. He admonishes you that perhaps you will be reminded"** [TMQ Surah An-Nahl: 90], and His saying, ﴿لَا يَنْهَاكُمُ اللَّهُ عَنِ الَّذِينَ لَمْ يُقَاتِلُوكُمْ فِي الدِّينِ وَلَمْ يُخْرِجُوكُم مِّن دِيَارِكُمْ أَن تَبَرُّوهُمْ وَتُقْسِطُوا إِلَيْهِمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ الْمُقْسِطِينَ﴾ **"Allah does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because of Deen and do not expel you from your homes from being righteous and just toward them. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly"** [TMQ Surah Al-Mumtahanah: 8]—the latter verse indicates permissibility, while the former is a command.

It is also due to the general command in His saying, ﴿وَأَعْبُدُوا اللَّهَ وَلَا تُشْرِكُوا بِهِ شَيْئًا وَبِالْوَالِدَيْنِ إِحْسَانًا وَبِذِي الْقُرْبَىٰ وَالْيَتَامَىٰ وَالْمَسَاكِينِ وَالْجَارِ ذِي الْقُرْبَىٰ وَالْجَارِ الْجُنُبِ وَالصَّاحِبِ بِالْجَنْبِ وَابْنِ السَّبِيلِ وَمَا مَلَكَتْ أَيْمَانُكُمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُحِبُّ مَنْ كَانَ مُخْتَلًا فُخُورًا﴾ “Worship Allah and associate nothing with Him, and to parents do good, and to relatives, orphans, the needy, the near neighbor, the distant neighbor, the companion at your side, the traveler (Ibn as-Sabeel), and those whom your right hands possess. Indeed, Allah does not like those who are self-deluding and boastful” [TMQ Surah An-Nisaa’: 36]—which does not specify a Muslim over a non-Muslim. The description Ibn as-Sabeel includes anyone who cannot find shelter, whether an individual or a family, because as-Sabeel means the path: their situation is similar. Therefore, by the explicit text of the verse, it is obligatory to treat Ibn as-Sabeel with kindness (إحسان ihsan), and there is no kindness in leaving him in the street with his child and family, or even alone; rather, that constitutes mistreatment and contravenes the explicit command to show kindness.

Fourth: The Shariah Rights Related to Housing

Given the importance of housing in human life, the Islamic Shariah has affirmed the right to housing for every individual in society, as previously discussed, and has also affirmed the rights associated with this right. We will clarify those rights as follows:

The Right to Freedom of Choosing and Using a Dwelling:

Every human being has complete freedom to choose the location of his dwelling and the type of dwelling, according to his financial capabilities and social level. He also has complete freedom to choose the furniture he deems suitable for this dwelling, in accordance with his personal taste, provided there is no extravagance and wastefulness, and what achieves his comfort. Every human being has the right to use his dwelling in the

manner that pleases him; he is only restricted in this by adhering to the Shariah rules and regulations which stipulate that there should be no harm and no reciprocation of harm. He is therefore obliged to use his dwelling in a way that does not cause harm to his neighbors or cause them annoyance of any kind.

Not Entering a Dwelling Without the Permission of Its Owner: And this is an affirmation of the inviolability of the home and a confirmation that it must not be violated. Islam has prohibited storming into a home without the permission of its owner, regardless of the intruder's status. For it is the right of every human being that no one enters his home except with his permission and consent, because a person's home is the place of his secrets and the abode of his family. Therefore, any entry without permission constitutes an aggression against the person himself and a violation of his home's sanctity, and this is impermissible, based on the saying of Allah ﷻ Who said: **يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا لَا تَدْخُلُوا بُيُوتًا غَيْرَ بُيُوتِكُمْ حَتَّى تَسْتَأْذِنُوا وَتُسَلِّمُوا عَلَى أَهْلِهَا ذَٰلِكُمْ خَيْرٌ لَّكُمْ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَذَكَّرُونَ فَإِنْ لَّمْ تَجِدُوا فِيهَا أَحَدًا فَلَا تَدْخُلُوهَا حَتَّى يُؤْذَنَ لَكُمْ وَإِنْ قِيلَ لَكُمْ ارْجِعُوا فَارْجِعُوا ۚ هُوَ أَزْكَى لَكُمْ وَاللَّهُ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ عَلِيمٌ** “O you who have believed, do not enter houses other than your own houses until you ascertain welcome and greet their inhabitants. That is best for you; perhaps you will be reminded. But if you do not find anyone therein, do not enter them until permission has been given you. And if it is said to you, ‘Go back,’ then go back; it is purer for you. And Allah is Knowing of what you do” [TMQ Surah An-Nur: 27-28].

We deduce from these two noble verses that they established the sanctity of the home in the most complete and perfect manner, fourteen centuries before international constitutions and declarations on human rights recognized this. It is impermissible for a person to enter another's house without

their permission. Even if he finds no one from the household present, he is not allowed to enter until he obtains permission from the owner of the house; because the home is the repository of a person's secrets, it is not permissible to storm it and access these secrets, even if its owner is outside for work or to attend to a need. This verse further emphasized the prohibition of entering houses without the permission of their owners by commanding the one seeking entry to turn back if requested by the homeowner, as Allah ﷻ said: ﴿وَإِنْ قِيلَ لَكُمْ اَرْجِعُوا فَارْجِعُوا هُوَ اَزْكٰى لَكُمْ ۚ وَاللهُ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ عَلِيمٌ﴾ **“And if you are told, ‘Go back,’ then go back; that is purer for you. And Allah is Knowing of what you do”** [TMQ An-Nur: 28].

The care of Islam to affirm the sanctity of the home and to prevent entry without the owner's permission was so great that Allah ﷻ guided Muslims to teach their children who have not yet reached puberty the etiquettes of seeking permission. He ﷻ said: ﴿يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لِيَسْتَأْذِنَكُمْ الَّذِينَ مَلَكَتْ أَيْمَانُكُمْ وَالَّذِينَ لَمْ يَبْلُغُوا الْحُلُمَ مِنْكُمْ ثَلَاثَ مَرَّاتٍ ۚ مِّن قَبْلِ صَلَاةِ الْفَجْرِ وَحِينَ تَضَعُونَ ثِيَابَكُمْ مِّنَ الظَّهِيرَةِ وَمِن بَعْدِ صَلَاةِ الْعِشَاءِ ۚ ثَلَاثُ عَوَرَاتٍ لَّكُمْ ۚ لَيْسَ عَلَيْكُمْ وَلَا عَلَيْهِمْ جُنَاحٌ بَعْدَ هُنَّ ۚ طَوَافُونَ ۚ﴾ **“O you who have believed, let those whom your right hands possess and those who have not yet reached puberty among you ask permission of you before entering at three times: before the Fajr Salah and when you put aside your clothing for rest at noon and after the ‘Isha Salah. These are three times of privacy for you. There is no blame upon you nor upon them beyond these periods, for they continually circulate among you - some of you, among others. Thus does Allah make clear to you the verses; and Allah is Knowing and Wise”** [TMQ Surah An-Nur: 58].

Prohibition of Seizure of the Home Without a Legitimate

Shariah Justification: If a person owns a dwelling, his ownership of it is protected by Shariah. It is not permissible for anyone to violate this ownership by seizing it or destroying it through demolition or otherwise, unless this is done by the ruler and is required by a public interest, such as widening a road that causes harm to passersby due to its narrowness or similar reasons, provided that the owner is compensated.

In summary, Islam has granted man the right to housing and has endowed the dwelling with sanctity and inviolability, because it is the repository of his secrets and the abode of his family. Therefore, it is not permissible for anyone to spy on it or to enter his home without his permission.

Thus, housing is a fundamental need for every human being and one of the necessities for a dignified life. The state is obligated to provide housing for all, along with the rest of the basic and essential needs for human life. This is what Islam has brought and what is established in Islamic Shariah. It is entirely different from what is adopted by man-made constitutions, and the reason for this difference lies in the differing view of the role of the state. For the role of the state in Islam is to care for and protect the interests of the people in a manner that agrees with and is harmonious with the objectives of Islamic Shariah.

The Rulers of Pakistan Have Handed Over the Rivers of the Ummah to the Hindu Enemy, and Only the Khilafah System Will Retrieve Them

Muhammad Abdullah – Occupied Kashmir

The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 is a water distribution treaty between India and Pakistan brokered by the World Bank. It was a colonialist division of life-giving water resources, designed to keep the two nation-states that emerged after colonialism within the Western colonial system and under political subservience.

The Stolen Lifeline: How Pakistan's Leaders Surrendered Water to India

On September 19, 1960, in Karachi, the regime of Ayub Khan, in submission to Washington and the World Bank, signed the Indus Waters Treaty. The treaty granted Pakistan “control” over the western rivers: the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab while it granted India unrestricted usage rights to the eastern rivers: Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. However, most importantly, India was granted the right to build “run-of-the-river” dams on the western rivers.

This classification was a disaster from the moment the ink dried on the agreement. India soon completely choked the eastern rivers. The dams—Bhakra on the Sutlej River, Pong on the Beas River, and Thein or Ranjit Sagar on the Ravi River—reduced the flow of these rivers to almost nothing. By choking these eastern rivers, Pakistan lost a colossal quantity of water. It was an unfair deal and a surrender under the glitter of American aid. The agent rulers did not surrender due to weakness, but

rather in collaboration with the very powers that view the Islamic Ummah as mere pawns to be moved as they please.

The Indus River Basin, which relies on the three western rivers under the Indus Waters Treaty, is Pakistan's beating heart. It irrigates more than 80% of the country's agricultural land, supports agriculture, and generates a significant portion of its hydroelectric power. Approximately, two-thirds of Pakistan's population of 240 million people depend on it directly or indirectly. The situation is further exacerbated by a catastrophic reduction in storage capacity; it is barely sufficient for about 30 days of average flow, compared to global recommendations exceeding 120 days. Furthermore, the Tarbela, Mangla, and Chashma reservoirs have lost between 22% and 37% of their capacity due to silt accumulation with further decline expected.

Per capita water share has declined from over 5,000 cubic meters at the time of the partition of India to approximately 1,000–1,200 cubic meters today, approaching the threshold of absolute scarcity.

Decades of Illusion and Negligence

For decades, a dark chapter prevailed in which treacherous leaders lied by claiming that the Indus Waters Treaty could not be violated. Consequently, the treaty remained in force even after many conflicts, including the wars from 1965 to 1971. From Kargil to surgical strikes, the rivers kept flowing. However, this fragile facade shattered after the Pulwama incident in 2019, when forty Indian soldiers were killed and the Hindu nationalist regime declared a water war. Data exchange ceased, and demands to amend the treaty were issued.

The final water suspension came in 2025, but the betrayal had already been sealed in 2019, when the leadership of Imran

Khan and Bajwa in Pakistan chose to do nothing when India unilaterally abrogated Article 370. India was discarding any international obligations it did not want into the trash bin, while the leadership of Pakistan was busy presenting futile complaints to the United Nations, the World Bank, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. India completed its occupation of Kashmir and accelerated the construction of its empire of dams; while the rulers of Pakistan were submitting complaints, India was pouring concrete.

Dams of Hegemony: India's Violations and Turning Water into a Weapon

Following the abrogation of Article 370 on August 5, 2019, India tightened its grip on Kashmir. It then placed the Indus Waters Treaty into a state of “suspension” following the Bahalgam incident in April 2025. India escalated forcefully, moving beyond the constraints of run-of-the-river projects. Driven by the ideological fervor of Hindutva, New Delhi unleashed a torrent of massive storage projects on the Chenab River, which collectively constitute a de facto dam of unprecedented scale. Official propaganda describes these projects as “run-of-the-river” hydropower stations, but engineering data reveals a lethal truth: they are designed with massive operational storage capacities that grant India absolute control over the timing of the Chenab River's flow, particularly during the crucial spring crop planting season when Pakistan needs every single drop.

India's declaration that the treaty was effectively placed in a state of “suspension” was formally articulated in official discourse following what Indian military circles termed “Operation Sindur.” Narendra Modi's statement that “blood and water cannot flow together” was not merely a slogan; it was a

political directive. The Indian Minister of Water Resources publicly announced the intention to stop the flow of India's share of water to Pakistan and to divert all the waters of the eastern rivers that still had some residual flow. Simultaneously, India accelerated all major storage projects on the western rivers, bypassing the dialogue of the Permanent Indus Commission and testing Pakistan's subdued response before the eyes of the world.

India is rapidly expanding its storage capacity and control over the Indus waters. The hydropower capacity controlled by the government and Indian companies in occupied Kashmir is rising from 3,540 megawatts to over 5,000 megawatts by the end of 2026, with ambitions to reach 12,000 megawatts. Four major projects on the Chenab River are being accelerated, including: the 1,000 MW Pakal Dul, the 624 MW Kiru, the 540 MW Kwar, and the 850 MW Ratle, alongside other projects like the Bursar, and Kirthai I & II 1 and 2. Improvements are also being made to the Baglihar and Salal projects, and new projects like the 1,856 MW Sawalkot and the Dulhasti Stage II are being implemented, along with silt flushing operations and other design modifications to maximize control. There are plans for large storage dams, exceeding run-of-the-river projects, on the tributaries of the Chenab and Jhelum, backed by an estimated investment push of around \$60 billion to increase storage from 15 days to over 55 days. This will allow India to withhold flows for about two months, which will destroy Pakistan's crops during the spring Rabi' and autumn Kharif seasons.

More dangerously, India is proceeding with the project for the tunnel linking the Chenab and the Beas in the Lahaul–Spiti region of Himachal Pradesh. The project involves an underground tunnel of 8.7 kilometers long and a barrier to divert surplus water

from the Chandra River—one of the upper tributaries that form the Chenab River at Tandi—westward to the basin of the Beas River, an eastern river allocated entirely to India. The cost of this infrastructure is estimated at 23,520 million Indian rupees. This infrastructure effectively transfers water outside the system of the western rivers, bypassing the treaty clause concerning the maintenance of water flows to Pakistan. India has exploited this loophole in the Indus Waters Treaty and applied it fully in the Kishanganga project, where it diverted a river while building substantial storage capacity that reduced flows to Pakistan's Neelum–Jhelum hydropower plant. This project was also used to test Pakistan's will to act, but its response remained confined to papers and petitions only. A tunnel for diverting sediments, costing 2,680 million Indian rupees at the Salal Dam, further enhances this control. This diversion mimics older precedents like the Kishanganga project, and Pakistan remained silent.

These are not benign hydropower projects, but rather “strategic weapons” for water warfare: releasing floods for destruction, withholding water during dry seasons to cause famine, and using water as a bargaining chip in future negotiations. The water sources in Kashmir, which have been under direct colonial administration since 2019, grant India a position of control from the highlands—both literally and figuratively—to subjugate Pakistan, which lies downstream. India is also rapidly expanding its storage capacity. Although current infrastructure limits its ability to withhold water completely, the trajectory is clear: the cumulative projects will enable greater regulation of flows, releasing floods during the rainy season or withholding water during droughts. This is preparation for “water warfare”—the use of water as a tool for future bargaining, coercion, and subjugation. Unannounced water releases have

already caused floods in Pakistan, while restricted flows threaten drought.

India has no intention whatsoever of cooperating in implementing the Indus Waters Treaty; instead, it is implementing a carefully planned, silent violation. It exploits every loophole in the treaty itself, as well as the hollow rhetoric of the leadership of Pakistan, and has built over 30 projects on the western rivers, turning them into tools of subjugation. In 2025, following the Pahalgam incident, India deliberately emptied its reservoirs, leading to the flooding of villages in Azad Kashmir. The Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) regime explicitly threatens to stop the water flow whenever it wishes. These dams are not engineering projects; they are the new swords of Hindutva.

Inaction of the Leadership of Pakistan

The response of the so-called leaders in Islamabad is nothing but empty rhetoric, press releases, and appeals to the very Western institutions that India openly ignores. What is the value of appeals directed at the international community, which is led by the United States, the principal ally of the Hindu state? The spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan speaks of “the weaponisation of water,” violations of the Indus Waters Treaty, and “serious repercussions,” and warns of a certain response, but he offers nothing concrete.

The leadership of Pakistan has perfected the art of filing complaints like court clerks, while the lifeblood artery is being slaughtered. It lost the Baglihar arbitration case and rejected legal notices. All responses are confined to futile diplomatic memos submitted to Washington and the World Bank. They surrendered occupied Kashmir through inaction and compromise,

and now they are preparing to surrender the very waters upon which Pakistan's life depends. The Kishanganga River diversion project is only the beginning. India plans to divert 70–80% of the flows, turning Pakistan into a desert. Therefore, Kashmir is not merely a disputed territory; it is the lifeblood artery of the Ummah. And every dam built on occupied land is a theft of the blood of the Muslims.

The current military leadership in Pakistan will do nothing beyond rhetoric, and India knows this, for the interests of this leadership are tied to the United States and the “hard state” that serves Washington. The betrayal will be complete when the taps run dry in Lahore, and the fields of Multan turn into dust-covered, cracked earth. Then, the Ummah will finally understand that independence cannot be leased out to agents. But by then, it will be too late. The opportunity must be seized today by those who carry the ‘Aqeedah (creed) and the sword. The Indus Waters Treaty was a colonialist noose tightened by treacherous hands; the dams are the knot that tightens, petitions have failed, and the agents must be removed.

O Muslims of Pakistan and its Armed Forces!

Your rulers have surrendered the rivers that feed your children. Dams are rising, and the noose is tightening. So, do not pin your hopes on their futile petitions or the colonial arbitrators. They are buying time for the enemy to dominate you. They keep you preoccupied while the enemy severs our lifelines. Under pressure from the US Vice President, they ordered a ceasefire in May 2025, just when the Pakistani Air Force had achieved air superiority and the liberation of occupied Kashmir had become inevitable.

Doesn't the Army Act of 1952 include Article 24, which addresses military crimes, stipulating that "directly or indirectly assists or relieves the enemy" —crimes punishable by death?

Return to Allah ﷻ and His Deen. Remove these agents, and establish the shield of the Muslims—the Khilafah (Caliphate)—which will unite us, build our strength, protect our waters, liberate Kashmir, and restore the Ummah's honor. Indeed, the rivers are our lifeblood, but our Iman (faith) is our true strength. Let the call for the Khilafah flow more powerfully than the Indus River, uprooting treachery and irrigating the fields of victory. The time for action is now. And victory comes from Allah alone. Then, Islam and the Muslims will be honored, and disbelief and the disbelievers will be disgraced. Allah ﷻ says, ﴿وَيَوْمَئِذٍ يَفْرَحُ الْمُؤْمِنُونَ * بِنَصْرِ اللَّهِ يَنْصُرُ مَنْ يَشَاءُ وَهُوَ الْعَزِيزُ الرَّحِيمُ﴾ **“And that day the believers will rejoice * In the victory of Allah. He gives victory to whom He wills, and He is the Exalted in Might, the Merciful”** [TMQ Surah Ar-Rum: 4-5].

‘Amr ibn Ma‘deekarib al-Zubaidi (ra)

Rayan Eisa – Iraq

He is ‘Amr ibn Ma‘dikaṛib (or Ma‘dee Yakrib) ibn ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Amr ibn ‘ASm ibn ‘Amr ibn Zubayd al-ASghar ibn Rabee‘ah ibn Salamah ibn Mazin ibn Rabee‘ah ibn Munabbih, who is Zubayd al-Akbar ibn al-Haarith ibn Sa‘b ibn Sa‘d al-‘Asheerah ibn Madhhij ibn Add ibn ‘Areeb ibn Yashjab ibn Zayd ibn Kahlaan ibn Saba’ ibn Yashjab ibn Ya‘rub ibn Qahṭaan.

The name Ma‘dikaṛib is an ancient Arabic masculine proper name of Yemeni origin, meaning, (الشخص الذي تعدّاه وتجاوزته الكرب) ((الغم والحزن) أو الفساد) “the one whom distress (grief and sorrow) or corruption has passed over and transcended.” It has also been said to mean the strong one, the supporter, or the blessed one.

The Prophet ﷺ said to ‘Amr ibn Ma‘dikaṛib when he came to him as a delegate and embraced Islam, addressing him and his brethren from the tribe of Zubayd in some narrations related to the rites of Hajj: «أَجِزُوا بَطْنَ عَرَفَةَ فَإِنَّمَا هُمْ إِذْ أَسْلَمُوا إِخْوَانُكُمْ» **“Proceed through the valley of ‘Arafah, for indeed, when they embraced Islam, they became your brethren,”** and he taught him and his people the correct form of the Talbiyah supplication.

In the pre-Islamic era (Jahiliyyah), he was a master of raids, renowned among the Arabs. Regarding this, Abu Muhammad Al-Hamdani said: «تثليث: واد بنجد، وهو على يومين من جرش، في شرقها إلى الجنوب، وعلى ثلاث مراحل ونصف من نجران، إلى ناحية الشمال. وتثليث لبني زبيد، وهم فيها إلى اليوم، وبها كان مسكن عمرو بن معد يكرب الزبيدي» **“Tathlith: a valley in Najd, located two days’ journey from Jarsh to its east and south, and three and a half stages from Najran towards the north. Tathlith belongs to the tribe of Zubayd, and**

they reside there to this day. It was the dwelling place of ‘Amr ibn Ma’dikarib Az-Zubaydi.”

In another place, he said: « تثليث وكان لعمر بن معد يكرب فيه حصن » “Tathlith, and ‘Amr ibn Ma’dikarib had a fortress and palm trees there.” His sister, Rayhanah, was the wife of As-Summah al-Asghar, and she bore him Durayd ibn As-Summah and ‘Abdullah. He was also the maternal cousin of Az-Zibriqaan ibn Badr.

He was one of the Companions (ra) and a giant in build and stature. Our Master ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (ra), whenever he saw him, would marvel at his physique and height and say, « سبحان من » “Glory be to the One who created us and created you, O ‘Amr!”

His Embracing of Islam:

Among the narrations concerning his embracing to Islam is that he said to his friend Qays ibn Makshuh when news of the Prophet ﷺ reached them: « قد ذكر لنا أن رجلاً من قريش يقال له محمد، قد خرج بالحجاز، يقول إنه نبي، فانطلق بنا إليه حتى ننظر أمره، فإن كان نبياً كما يقول؛ It has been mentioned to us that a man from Quraysh named Muhammad has appeared in the Hijaaz, claiming he is a prophet. Let us go to him so that we may examine his matter. If he is a prophet as he claims, then it will not be hidden from you. If he is other than that, we will know.” Qays ibn Makshuh refused this, so ‘Amr went alone to Al-Madinah. He stayed as a guest with Sa’d ibn ‘Ubaadah, who honored him, and then Sa’d took him to the Prophet ﷺ, and he embraced Islam.

He was a poet and a horseman, renowned for his courage and chivalry to the extent that he was nicknamed Faaris al-‘Arab (فارس العرب The Horseman of the Arabs) and he had a sword named “As-Samsamah” (صمصامة the reliable sharp sword). ‘Umar

ibn al-Khaṭṭab asked ‘Amr ibn Ma’dikarib to send him this famous sword of his. ‘Amr sent the sword to the Ameer al-Mu’mineen (Commander of the Faithful). ‘Umar struck with it but did not find it to be of the level of strength and sharpness he had heard about. ‘Umar wrote to ‘Amr admonishing him for that. ‘Amr replied to him, saying: (إنما بعثت إلى أمير المؤمنين بالسيف، ولم أبعث بالساعد الذي يضرب به) “I only sent the sword to the Ameer al-Mu’mineen; I did not send the arm that wields it.”

He participated in the Islamic conquests in Ash-Sham and Iraq, and was present at the Battles of Al-Yarmuk and Al-Qadisiyyah, never once failing to join a war alongside the Muslims against their enemies. The Ameer al-Mu’mineen, ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭab (ra), recognized ‘Amr’s worth and status, considering him equal to a thousand horsemen, and he would instruct his commanders to consult with ‘Amr ibn Ma’dikarib regarding the conduct of the Islamic conquest campaigns in which he took part.

On the Day of Al-Yarmuk, he fought with courage and self-sacrifice, seeking martyrdom, until the enemy was defeated and fled before the soldiers of Allah ﷻ. And just before the Battle of Al-Qadisiyyah, the army commander, Sa’d ibn Abi Waqqas (ra), requested reinforcements from the Ameer al-Mu’mineen, ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭab, to aid him in the war against the Persians. So the Ameer al-Mu’mineen sent to Sa’d only two men: ‘Amr ibn Ma’dikarib and Ṭulayhah ibn Khuwaylid, saying in his message to Sa’d: «إني أمددتك بألفي رجل» “I have reinforced you with two thousand men.”

When the fighting began, ‘Amr threw himself into the ranks of the enemy, striking to the right and left. When the Muslims saw him, they charged behind him, cutting down the heads of the Persians like a harvest. During the battle, ‘Amr stood

amidst the troops, encouraging them to fight, saying: « يا معشر O company of Muhajireen, be fierce lions, for a horseman loses all hope once he casts aside his spear.” When one of the Persian commanders saw him encouraging his companions, he shot an arrow at him, which hit his bow but did not strike him. ‘Amr charged at him, stabbed him, then took him amidst the ranks of the Muslims, severed his head, and said to the Muslims: « اصنعوا هكذا ” “Do like this.” He continued fighting until Allah ﷻ granted victory to the Muslims.

And he said regarding his own actions and those of his people during the Battle of Al-Qadisiyyah:

..والقادسية حين زاحم رستم ... كنا الحماة بهن كالأشطان

..الضاريين بكل أبيض مخدّم ... والطاعنين مجامع الأضغان

“And at Al-Qadisiyyah, when Rustam jostled... We were the protectors of the womenfolk like protective ropes.

The strikers with every sharp-edged sword... and the stabbers at the centers of skirmishes...”

In the Battle of Nahavand, the conquest of Nahavand proved difficult for the Muslims, so ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (ra) sent a message to an-Nu‘maan ibn Muqarrin, the commander of the army, saying: « اسْتَشِرْ واستعن في حربك بطلحة وعمر بن معد يكرب، وشاورهما في الحرب، ولا تُؤلِّهما من الأمر شيئاً، فإن كل صانع هو أعلم بصناعته » “Seek counsel and seek assistance in your war from Ṭulayhah and ‘Amr ibn Ma’dikarib, and consult them about the war, but do not appoint either of them to any command, for every craftsman is more knowledgeable about his craft.” And ‘Amr fought in this battle with the fiercest fighting until Allah granted the Muslims victory at Nahavand.

His Death:

He was martyred as a Mujaahid as a result of wounds sustained in the Battle of Nahavand in 21 AH, according to the most reliable accounts. His wounds were numerous. Indeed, 'Amr ibn Ma'dikarib attained martyrdom in that battle and was buried in the village of Rudhah near Nahavand.

Attributes of the Fasiqeen (فاسقين Defiantly Disobedient)

Khalifa Muhammad – Jordan

Allah ﷻ says: ﴿وَمَا يُضِلُّ بِهِ إِلَّا الْفَاسِقِينَ * الَّذِينَ يَنْقُضُونَ عَهْدَ اللَّهِ مِنْ بَعْدِ مِيثَاقِهِ وَيَقْطَعُونَ مَا أَمَرَ اللَّهُ بِهِ أَنْ يُوصَلَ وَيُفْسِدُونَ فِي الْأَرْضِ أُولَٰئِكَ هُمُ الْخَاسِرُونَ﴾ **“and He causes none to go astray except the defiantly disobedient * Who break the covenant of Allah after its binding (pledge) and sever what Allah has ordered to be joined and cause corruption on earth. It is those who are the losers”** [TMQ Surah Al-Baqarah: 26-27].

In a previous issue, we reflected upon the twenty-sixth verse of Surah Al-Baqarah, which concludes with the statement of Allah ﷻ: ﴿وَمَا يُضِلُّ بِهِ إِلَّا الْفَاسِقِينَ﴾: **“and He leads none astray except the defiantly disobedient”** [TMQ Surah Al-Baqarah: 26]. We explained that Fisq (فسق deviance) signifies a departure from an original state, like a chick breaking out of its eggshell. Deviating from the rulings of the Shariah constitutes fisq (deviation); thus, the transgressors whom Allah ﷻ leads astray through His signs and parables are those who depart from the rulings He has ordained. This, by no means, implies that Allah ﷻ compels the misguided to stray, nor the guided to be guided. Instead, Allah ﷻ recompenses every doer for his deeds in this world. So, for the one who chooses guidance to the Straight Path of Allah, Allah ﷻ facilitates for him the means of guidance. And for the one who deviates from the Shariah rulings of Allah ﷻ and chooses misguidance, then Allah ﷻ facilitates for him the causes of misguidance.

And in this issue, we reflect upon the twenty-seventh verse of Surah Al-Baqarah, which mentions some of the characteristics of the hypocrites (منافقون munafiqun) and their ultimate fate. The first of these characteristics is that they break the covenant of Allah after its solemn binding. Breaking (نقض naqd) means to undo after finalization and to annul after commitment. A covenant (عهد 'ahad) is an instruction, an agreement, or a pact. Mutual agreement and pledging both refer to an accord. As for a solemn covenant (ميثاق meethaq), it is more specific and emphatic than a general covenant, meaning it is a stronger, more binding ratification.

As for the covenant of Allah ﷻ, it is general and includes all of Allah's covenants. Allah has mentioned in the Noble Qur'an covenants that He has taken upon His creation, obliging them to fulfill them and not break them. An example of this is the saying of Allah ﷻ Who said: ﴿وَأَشْهَدُهُمْ عَلَى أَنْفُسِهِمْ أَلَسْتُ بِرَبِّكُمْ قَالُوا بَلَىٰ﴾ **“And He made them testify of themselves, asking, ‘Am I not your Lord?’ They said, ‘Yes’”** [TMQ Surah Al-A'raaf: 172). He exacted this pledge from all the children of Aadam (as), requiring them to acknowledge His Lordship based on the innate nature (فطرة fitrah) He instilled in them, characterized by natural incapacity and absolute need for Him ﷻ. And among these covenants is His covenant with the prophets to convey the message of Allah, the Almighty, as He said: ﴿وَإِذْ أَخَذْنَا مِنَ النَّبِيِّينَ مِيثَاقَهُمْ وَمِنْكَ وَمِنْ نُوحٍ وَإِبْرَاهِيمَ وَمُوسَىٰ وَعِيسَىٰ ابْنِ مَرْيَمَ وَأَخَذْنَا مِنْهُمْ مِيثَاقًا غَلِيظًا﴾ **“And mention, O Muhammad, when We took from the prophets their covenant and from you and from Nuh (as), Ibrahim (as), Musa (as) and Eesa (as), the son of Maryam; and We took from them a solemn covenant”** [TMQ Surah Al-Ahzab: 7]. And amongst these covenants is the solemn covenant that He ﷻ took upon those who were given the Scripture to make it clear

to the people and not conceal it, as He said, **﴿إِذْ أَخَذَ اللَّهُ مِيثَاقَ الَّذِينَ أُوتُوا الْكِتَابَ لَتُبَيِّنُنَّهُ لِلنَّاسِ وَلَا تَكْتُمُونَهُ﴾** **“And mention when Allah took a covenant from those who were given the Scripture, saying, ‘You must make it clear to the people and not conceal it’”** [TMQ Surah Aali 'Imran: 187].

And it includes the covenant of Allah ﷻ, His commands to His servants and His prohibitions for them, which necessitate hearing and obedience. So, He ﷻ said: **﴿وَلَقَدْ عَهِدْنَا إِلَى آدَمَ مِنْ قَبْلُ فَنَسِيَ وَلَمْ نَجِدْ لَهُ عَزْمًا﴾** **“And We had already taken a covenant from Aadam (as) before, but he forgot; and We found not in him determination”** [TMQ Surah Ta-Ha: 115], meaning, We commanded him and forbade him, but he forgot and disobeyed. And He ﷻ said: **﴿وَاذْكُرُوا نِعْمَةَ اللَّهِ عَلَيْكُمْ وَمِيثَاقَهُ الَّذِي وَاثَقَكُمْ بِهِ إِذْ قُلْتُمْ سَمِعْنَا وَأَطَعْنَا﴾** **“And remember the favor of Allah upon you and His covenant with which He bound you when you said, ‘We hear and we obey’”** [TMQ Surah Al-Ma'idah: 7]. So, the covenant which Allah ﷻ took upon the believers concerning the risaalah (رسالة message) of Muhammad ﷺ is His ﷻ commands and prohibitions, which necessitate hearing and obedience after their belief in Him ﷻ.

Thus, the most prominent characteristic of the fasiqeen is their breaking of Allah's covenant by disbelieving after the testimony to which He ﷻ made them bear witness against themselves, and after He sent them the Messenger ﷺ to convey His commands and prohibitions to them. It also includes their disobedience of His commands and their commission of what He has forbidden, for disbelief in Allah ﷻ is *fisq* (فسق defiant disobedience), and disobedience to His commands is also *fisq*. The fasiqun are those who have taken a path from the paths of misguidance that necessitates the extension in punishment of being led astray. Some Quranic commentators (مفسرون)

mufasirun) have said that those intended by fasiqeen described with these attributes are the Jews. However, the more correct view is that it includes all corrupt people in general even if the verse was revealed concerning the Jews and others from the mushrikeen, because (العبرة بعموم اللفظ لا بخصوص السبب) “The consideration is for the generality of the wording, not the specificity of the cause.” The Shariah ruling of being led astray is linked to the derived noun (مشتق mushtaq) “fasiqeen,” which is an active participle (اسم فاعل ism fa’il), and linking a ruling to a derived noun (مشتق mushtaq) indicates the causality (عِلِّيَّة ‘iliyyah) of the source of derivation (اشتقاق ishtiqaaq), as established in the fundamentals (أصول usul) of Shariah jurisprudence. The source of derivation is fisq (فسق deviance). Therefore, everyone who is characterized by this attribute deserves the extension in punishment of being led astray, and this includes the Jews as well as other than the Jews.

As for His ﷻ saying, ﴿وَيَقْطَعُونَ مَا أَمَرَ اللَّهُ بِهِ أَنْ يُوصَلَ﴾ **“and they sever what Allah has commanded to be enjoined”** [TMQ Surah Al-Baqarah: 27] — this is the second characteristic of the fasiqeen who deserve misguidance; namely, that they sever what Allah ﷻ has commanded to be enjoined. And what Allah has commanded to be joined is general because “what” (ما maa) is a relative pronoun (اسم موصول ism mawsool) from the words of generality in the language. Thus, it includes maintaining kinship ties, keeping ties with relatives, dutifulness to parents, kindness to neighbors, honoring the guest and everything that involves enjoined ties. It also includes ties with Allah ﷻ through obedience to Him, and ties with His Messenger ﷺ through obedience to him. Therefore, anyone who intentionally severs anything that Allah ﷻ has commanded to be enjoined, while

being aware of what they are doing, is from the defiantly disobedient who deserve misguidance.

As for His ﷻ saying: ﴿وَيُفْسِدُونَ فِي الْأَرْضِ﴾ **“and they spread corruption in the earth”** — the root meaning of spreading corruption (فسد fasada) in the Arabic language is the frustration of a purpose and the removal of benefit, and if it involves harm, it is even more emphatic. It includes causing harm to others, whether by word or by deed. It also includes polytheism (شرك shirk) because it corrupts the innate disposition (فطرة fitrah) and diverts a person from what they should be upon. Furthermore, it includes all acts of disobedience. Therefore, every corruptor is from among the corrupt (al-fasiqeen) who deserve misguidance (إضلال idlaal).

As for His ﷻ saying: ﴿أُولَئِكَ هُمُ الْخَاسِرُونَ﴾ **“It is they who are the losers”** describes those who possess those attributes, or some of them, as being in a state of loss. At-Tabari said: (الخاسرون: جمع خاسر، وهم الناقصون أنفسهم وحظوظهم بمعصيتهم الله من رحمته، كما يخسر الرجل في تجارته؛ بأن يوضع من رأس ماله في بيعه، وكذلك الكافر والمنافق) “The ‘losers’ (خاسرون khasirun) is the plural of loser (خاسر khasir), and they are those who have diminished their own souls and their shares by their disobedience to Allah, and thus from His mercy—just as a man incurs a loss in his trade when the capital of his sale is reduced. Likewise, the disbeliever and the hypocrite incur a loss through Allah depriving them of His mercy.”

And condemnation of these attributes has been mentioned in various places in the Noble Quran. Among these is His ﷻ saying: ﴿وَالَّذِينَ يَنْقُضُونَ عَهْدَ اللَّهِ مِنْ بَعْدِ مِيثَاقِهِ وَيَقْطَعُونَ مَا أَمَرَ اللَّهُ بِهِ أَنْ يُوصَلَ وَيُفْسِدُونَ فِي الْأَرْضِ أُولَئِكَ لَهُمُ اللَّعْنَةُ وَلَهُمْ سُوءُ الدَّارِ﴾ **“And those who break the covenant of Allah after its ratification, and sever what Allah has commanded to be joined, and spread corruption**

on earth—for them is the curse, and for them is the evil abode” [TMQ Surah Ar-Ra’d: 25]. And He ﷻ informed that for them is the curse and for them is the evil abode—and in both the curse and the evil abode there is a loss beyond which there is no loss. In contrast, Allah ﷻ praised those who fulfill the covenant of Allah ﷻ and join what Allah ﷻ has commanded to be joined as He ﷻ said: ﴿أَقَمَن يَعْلَمُ أَنَّمَا أُنْزِلَ إِلَيْكَ مِنْ رَبِّكَ الْحَقُّ كَمَنْ هُوَ أَعْمَى إِنَّمَا يَتَذَكَّرُ أُولَؤُا ۚ﴾ **الْأَلْبَابِ * الَّذِينَ يُوفُونَ بِعَهْدِ اللَّهِ وَلَا يَنْفُضُونَ الْمِيثَاقَ * وَالَّذِينَ يَصِلُونَ مَا أَمَرَ اللَّهُ** ﴿Is he who knows that what has been revealed to you from your Lord is the truth like one who is blind? Only those endowed with understanding will remember * Those who fulfill the covenant of Allah and do not break the covenant, * And those who enjoin what Allah has commanded to be enjoined” [TMQ Surah Ar-Ra’d: 19-21]. He ﷻ praised them and promised them a good outcome as He ﷻ said about them: ﴿أُولَئِكَ لَهُمْ عَقَبَى الدَّارِ * جَنَّاتٌ عَدْنٍ يَدْخُلُونَهَا وَمَنْ صَلَحَ مِنْ آبَائِهِمْ وَأَزْوَاجِهِمْ وَذُرِّيَّاتِهِمْ وَالْمَلَائِكَةُ يَدْخُلُونَ عَلَيْهِمْ مِنْ كُلِّ بَابٍ * سَلَامٌ عَلَيْكُمْ بِمَا صَبَرْتُمْ فَنِعْمَ عُقْبَى الدَّارِ﴾ **“For them will be the ultimate abode— * Gardens of perpetual residence, which they will enter along with whoever was righteous among their forefathers, their spouses, and their descendants. And the angels will enter upon them from every gate, * [saying], ‘Peace be upon you for what you patiently endured. And excellent is the ultimate abode’”** [TMQ Surah Ar-Ra’d: 22-24].

And we conclude our reflection with the Noble Quran by pointing out those who are the most frequent violators of covenants and pledges; namely, the Jews. Allah ﷻ has described them in numerous places in the Quran as breaking covenants and repeating this behavior. Among these instances is His ﷻ saying: ﴿أَوَلَمَّْا عَاهَدُوا عَهْدًا نَبَذَهُ فَرِيقٌ مِّنْهُمْ بَلْ أَكْثَرُهُمْ لَا يُؤْمِنُونَ﴾ **“And is it not that every time they took a covenant, a party of them threw it**

away? But, in fact, most of them do not believe.” [TMQ Surah Al-Baqarah: 100]. Their current state of treachery, deceit, and deception bears witness to this.

News of Muslims Around the World

Jordan's Rulers Desperately Hand Over the Country to America, Britain, and the West for Fear of the Monarchy's Overthrow

The American network CBS, a news partner of the BBC, reported that American fighter jets were damaged by Iranian strikes targeting the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, while Amman did not mention any damage resulting from these strikes. The network quoted sources stating that “varied damage” was sustained by eight F-15 aircraft, all of which were returned to service, while an A-10 Thunderbolt aircraft was damaged and lost one of its wings.

The American network stated that it “learned that U.S. forces in Jordan launched more than 30 Patriot missiles to counter the Iranian strikes in Jordan.” The Jordanian army announced on Wednesday that the Kingdom was subjected to a “missile attack originating from Iranian territory.” The Jordanian army reported that “the Jordanian air defense’s engagement with 20 ballistic missiles launched towards Jordanian territory, successfully intercepting and destroying 18 of them...with two missiles landing in unpopulated areas.”

The Jewish Entity Rampages in Ash-Sham (the Levant) Unchecked by the New Rulers of Damascus

“Israeli” media reported that the “Israeli” Defense Minister, Yisrael Katz, conducted a tour in areas inside Syria, affirming that

“Israel will not withdraw from Mount Hermon or the buffer zone as long as threats against us persist.”

Katz said that the message directed to Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa is “perfectly clear,” adding: “When you wake up in the morning in your palace in Damascus, look toward Mount Hermon and you will see the “Israeli” Defense Forces, and you will know that we are here to protect our communities and our borders.” Katz accused Türkiye of trying to “enhance its presence in Syria,” considering that “this poses a threat to “Israeli” security interests,” and said that “Israel” has acted against this attempt. The “Israeli” Defense Minister affirmed that his country has made its position “perfectly clear” and will continue to adhere to it in the future.

Inflation: An Economic Nightmare in Capitalism and Monetary Policy in Islam as Its Solution

Umm Badr

Inflation has ceased to be merely a numerical phenomenon appearing in central bank bulletins; it has become one of the economic problems most closely linked to people's daily lives. The purchasing power of income declines, savings erode, and the cost of food, housing, energy, and services rises. Those with fixed incomes find themselves facing an economic reality harsher than the one reflected by abstract figures. Consequently, monetary policy has gained a central position in managing the modern economy. The state bank now raises or lowers interest rates, alters credit and liquidity conditions, and intervenes in financial markets, all with the aim of influencing demand, prices, and growth.

The dominant contemporary capitalist view, in its prevalent form, is based on the relative independence of central banks and the targeting of price stability, and in many economies, on a specific inflation target close to 2%. This is clearly evident in the policy of the European Central Bank, which states that price stability is achieved by targeting an inflation rate of 2% in the medium term, and uses interest rates and other tools to achieve this. The dominant economic discourse also acknowledges that inflation may arise from excessive monetary expansion, supply shocks, rising energy costs, or increased demand.

However, Islam does not view the monetary problem as separate from the nature of the economic and political system

within which money, property, production, and distribution are organized. It addresses the subject of money, currency exchange, the gold standard, money issuance, and exchange rates within a single system, and it establishes gold and silver as the basis for the Islamic monetary system. It emphasizes that inflation is not merely a cyclical flaw that can be treated by raising or lowering interest rates; rather, inflation is fundamentally linked to the fiat paper monetary system and the detachment of currency from a fixed material value.

The Concept of Inflation and the Status of Monetary Policy

Inflation, in the general economic definition, is a sustained rise in the general price level that leads to a decrease in the purchasing power of a monetary unit. It does not refer merely to the rise in the price of a single commodity, as the price of a good may rise due to a crop failure or a disruption in supplies without that constituting general inflation in the aggregate sense.

Recent economic research points to multiple sources of inflation. The International Monetary Fund distinguishes between inflation resulting from monetary expansion that outpaces economic growth, demand pressures, and supply shocks along with rising production and energy costs. This distinction is important because it shows that inflation cannot always be explained by a single factor. Additionally, the European Central Bank noted in 2026 that rising energy prices caused by war and geopolitical turmoil can spill over into the prices of goods and services, affecting core inflation and price expectations.

This is where monetary policy comes in. When the central bank sees that inflation is persistently high, it can raise interest rates; this makes borrowing more expensive, which weakens certain forms of spending and investment, thereby reducing

pressure on demand. The opposite occurs when interest rates are lowered, as financing becomes cheaper, leading to increased borrowing, investment, and consumption, which can support economic activity when inflation is low and demand is weak.

The transmission mechanism can be simplified as follows:

Higher interest rates → higher borrowing costs → decrease in some forms of consumption and investment → decline in aggregate demand → reduced price pressures.

However, this mechanism is not magical. If inflation is primarily caused by a shortage of energy or food or disruptions in supply chains, raising interest rates does not produce oil, open ports, or increase crops. Therefore, central banks are forced to balance between the goal of price stability and the risk of weakening economic activity and employment.

The Capitalist Interpretation of Inflation

There is no single “capitalism” in all its details, but the dominant economic school within contemporary capitalist economies deals with inflation as a problem that can be managed through a mix of monetary, fiscal, and supply-side policies. Central banks consider price stability a primary goal, while using interest rates, liquidity management, and communication with the markets to guide the expectations of households and companies.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) offers a complex explanation: prolonged periods of high inflation can result from an accommodative monetary policy, when the money supply grows faster than the economy's capacity to produce goods and services; at the same time, supply shocks, such as rising oil prices, can drive up prices, and an increase in demand due to expansionary policies can also create price pressures.

This means that the capitalist remedy is not confined to a single tool. In the case of demand-pull inflation, interest rates are an important tool. In the case of a supply shock, the state may need to address bottlenecks in production, energy, and supply chains, and it may use fiscal or regulatory measures. This was evident in the European Central Bank's statements during 2026, when the bank linked the rise in inflation to the energy shock resulting from the war, while simultaneously using interest rates to anchor medium-term inflation expectations.

However, this treatment faces a fundamental paradox: the monetary tool that curbs inflation may harm economic activity. Raising interest rates reduces demand, but it also increases the cost of financing for households, companies, and governments. If the economy is already suffering from weak production, the treatment for inflation could turn into a treatment for demand at the expense of investment and employment.

Islam's Refutation of the Capitalist Monetary System

The issue of currency holds a fundamental status within the Islamic economic system. Money, the gold standard, the benefits of the gold standard, paper currency, currency issuance, and exchange rates are all fundamentals and matters pertaining to the state's economy. The idea that currency is not merely paper upon which the state places a name and a legal value, but rather must be linked to a monetary basis of gold and silver, is one of the fundamental rulings in monetary policy that constitutes a radical solution to many economic problems.

Thus, Islam made gold and silver the basis for currency, while permitting the use of other means of exchange provided they represent a known quantity of gold or silver—not as a fiat currency separate from a fixed material basis. As for

contemporary fiat currencies, their strength depends on the issuing authority and confidence in the monetary system, which is one of the causes of monetary instability.

For example, the deeper cause of the inflation occurring after the Ukrainian war can be attributed to the exposed monetary system, which is not based on intrinsic value or a fixed foundation of goods and services, in addition to global monetary floating and the possibility of expanding money issuance.

From the Islamic perspective, the problem does not begin when the price index rises, but before that: it begins when the issuance of currency becomes a flexible tool in the hands of the state and the banking system, and the money supply can be expanded without a strict material constraint. At that point, a separation can arise between the quantity of money and the real economy, causing the purchasing power of the currency to decline.

Interest and Credit in the Capitalist Vision and the Islamic Perspective

Modern monetary policy relies heavily on the interest rate. Interest is a tool to control the cost of borrowing, thereby influencing demand and investment. During times of inflation, raising interest rates is one of the most common measures taken. In June 2026, the European Central Bank raised interest rates by 25 basis points, justifying this move by citing inflationary pressures related to energy and war, while affirming its goal of stabilizing inflation at 2% in the medium term.

However, Islam views interest from a different legal and economic perspective; interest (ربا) is forbidden in Islam, and therefore, Islamic monetary policy cannot be built upon a usurious interest rate. In the Islamic economic conception,

monetary dealings must be based on the rulings governing currency exchange, gold, and silver, and usury is prohibited in loans and financial transactions.

Herein lies the fundamental difference: Capitalism uses interest as a tool to manage the economic cycle, whereas the Islamic system abolishes interest at its root and seeks to manage economic activity by regulating property, currency, spending, production, and trade—not through a usurious interest rate.

Monetary Policy: Between Managing Inflation and Managing the Economic System

One of the most significant points of disagreement lies in the very definition of the problem. The capitalist central bank sees its primary task as achieving price stability, and thus it sets a numerical target and adjusts its tools to reach it. In contrast, Islam views the treatment of inflation as not merely targeting a price index, because rising prices may be the result of deeper imbalances in the structure of the economic system.

Herein lies the difference between “managing the phenomenon” and “removing the cause.” A central bank may be able to reduce inflation by raising interest rates, but this does not necessarily mean it has removed the causes of the fragility of the monetary system, debt, speculation, or international imbalances. Conversely, treating a supply shock with monetary policy alone may be of limited effectiveness.

Why Does Islam Not View Inflation as Solely a Monetary Problem?

It is because Islam does not approach the economy from the perspective of it being merely monetary figures, but instead from the “economic policy” that defines the state’s relationship with ownership, production, and distribution. The fundamental

economic problem is not the scarcity of goods and services, but the distribution of wealth and enabling people to satisfy their needs.

This changes the perspective on inflation. If prices rise while incomes remain fixed, the harm is not equal among people. A person with substantial financial wealth may be able to absorb the price increases, while the worker and the person with a limited income are harmed to a greater extent. Consequently, distributive justice becomes part of the solution to the economic crisis.

Thus, the Islamic economic system links the three types of property—private property, public property, and property of the state—with economic balance in society. Moreover, Islam makes the fulfillment of people's basic needs one of the objectives of the state's economic care.

Therefore, the solution is not limited to restoring the value of the currency; rather, it includes regulating the ownership of public resources, preventing monopoly, applying the rules of Zakat and public spending, and managing wealth in a manner that achieves the fulfillment of basic needs.

Gold and Silver, as a Monetary Solution, Were Mandated by Shariah Law

Gold and silver represent the cornerstone of the Islamic conception; thus, the primary currency is to be gold and silver, and paper money can exist as a substitute for them. The evidence for this is that gold dinars and silver dirhams existed before Islam, coming from the Romans and Persians, and Islam did not begin by inventing them anew. Instead, the Prophet ﷺ gave consent (إقرار iqraar) for their use in transactions, and the use of the dinar

and dirham continued in the Islamic State until Islamic coinage was minted independently during the era of Khaleefah (Caliph) Abdul Malik bin Marwan. The Prophet ﷺ made gold and silver the subject of rulings regarding exchange (şarf), interest (riba), and Zakat, considering them to be prices, i.e., monetary standards, and therefore they are not merely two ordinary commodities within the Islamic financial system. It is narrated from 'Ubadah bin As-Samit (ra) that the Prophet ﷺ said: «الذهب» **Gold for gold, silver for silver... equal for equal, measure for measure, hand to hand.**

A gold-based monetary system achieves a greater degree of monetary stability and limits the ability of governments and central banks to issue currency without a physical constraint. Furthermore, the stability of the monetary base helps stabilize exchange rates and foreign trade.

And this is not merely a technical proposal to treat inflation, but rather it is part of a comprehensive political legislative system: changing the nature of money means changing the state's relationship with financing, the banks' relationship with credit, international trade's relationship with currencies, and the limits of the state's capacity for monetary expansion.

Islam's perspective does not rely on "the central bank reducing the money supply," but rather mandates a transition to a fundamentally different monetary system.

Does Gold Prevent Inflation Absolutely?

The gold standard prevents a fundamental type of inflation that results from the uncontrolled issuance of currency. However, the modern economy shows that prices can rise for other reasons, such as wars, disasters, production shortages,

changes in transportation and energy costs, taxes, and market imbalances. Therefore, the issue should not be framed in an oversimplified manner that claims “gold prevents all price increases.” A more accurate formulation is that making gold the basis for currency imposes a constraint on monetary issuance and limits the ability of the monetary authority to increase the money supply independently of a physical asset.

This differs from the system of fiat currencies, where monetary authorities can manage liquidity using more flexible methods. This flexibility is simultaneously a source of strength in crisis management and a source of danger if misused.

Capitalism: Between Monetary Flexibility and the Debt Problem

From the perspective of its proponents, one of the strengths of the capitalist monetary system is its ability to respond to crises. When a severe recession occurs, the central bank can lower interest rates, provide liquidity, and purchase assets, and the government can increase public spending. Modern economies have employed these tools during multiple crises.

But the other hidden aspect is the accumulation of debts. Cheap credit can lead to a massive expansion in borrowing, causing asset, real estate, and stock prices to inflate. Then problems emerge when interest rates are raised or when liquidity contracts. The usurious capitalist financial system generates recurring crises, and treating a crisis with the tools of the very same system may postpone the problem rather than uproot it.

However, according to the Shariah rulings of Islam, the prohibition of interest is not a separate, isolated ruling detached from the economic system; instead, it is part of a comprehensive

framework that prevents certain forms of financial exploitation and redirects activity toward the real economy.

Direct Comparison Between the Two Narratives

The differences can be summarized in five main areas:

Definition of the Problem: The dominant capitalism views inflation as a general and sustained rise in prices that requires controlling its expectations and its monetary, demand, and supply sources. Islam, however, attributes it, to a greater degree, to the nature of the paper monetary system and to the imbalances of the capitalist economic system.

The Instrument of Treatment: Capitalism relies on interest rates, liquidity management, communication with markets, fiscal policy, and supply-side policies. In contrast, the Islamic perspective prohibits usurious interest and relies on a monetary system based on gold and silver, along with regulations for ownership, spending, and trade.

Money Issuance: In the capitalist system, monetary authorities possess broad scope to manage the supply of money and credit. In the Islamic system, the issuance of currency is restricted by gold and silver, which limits monetary expansion not linked to a physical asset.

The Function of the State: Under Capitalism, the function of the state varies according to the economic school and the specific state, but the central bank focuses primarily on monetary stability, while vast sectors are left to the market. Under the Islamic system, the state is a guardian (راعية raa'iyyah); it manages assets of public property and ensures the fulfillment of basic needs, all within the rulings of the Shariah.

The Ultimate Solution: Capitalism typically seeks to reform monetary and fiscal policy within the existing system. However, Islamic Shariah holds that partial reform is insufficient, and that the solution requires a complete change of the ruling system and the implementation of the Islamic economic system.

Inflation and the High Cost of Living from a Political Perspective

Inflation cannot be understood in isolation from international politics. Currency is not merely a means of domestic payment; it is part of the international power structure. Although currency has shifted from the gold standard to paper currencies, its value has become tied to the influence of major powers. The current dominance of the US dollar over the international monetary system is the greatest evidence of this.

In contrast, capitalist economies see that flexible paper currencies allow for absorbing external shocks, facilitating international trade, and managing crises. However, the dominance of a single international currency grants the issuing state significant political and financial advantages and influences global energy prices, trade, and finance.

Hence, the issue of inflation becomes a matter of independence as well: Who has the authority to issue currency? Who sets the interest rate? Who bears the impact of currency devaluation? And who benefits from the global financial system?

Critique of the Capitalist Approach from Within Its Own Reality

It is not correct to say that capitalist monetary policy “does not work” at all; raising interest rates can reduce demand and inflation, and central banks have succeeded in returning inflation

toward their targets during various periods. Moreover, targeting inflation provides a clear framework for expectations.

However, the problem arises when the causes of inflation are beyond the scope of monetary policy. If energy prices rise due to war or a supply shortage, raising interest rates does not increase the quantity of energy. If supply chains are disrupted, interest rates do not produce the missing goods. This is why central banks themselves acknowledge the existence of supply shocks and use monetary policy cautiously to avoid turning a temporary shock into persistent inflation. Furthermore, high interest rates have a social cost: higher loan installments, reduced investment, a weak real estate market, and an increased debt service burden.

The Islamic Solution to the Crisis of Inflation

The solution offered by Islam's system is internally coherent, as it constitutes an integrated system: a currency of gold and silver, the prohibition of interest, the organization of ownership of property, the protection of public property, the state's management of assets of public property, and the realization of economic equity. Someone may ask: How can we transition from the current system of paper currencies to a gold-based system? And how can long-term investment be financed without interest? We say: The transition from the compulsory paper monetary system to a system of gold and silver is not merely a matter of replacing existing banknotes with gold coins. Instead, it is achieved by rebuilding the monetary system on the basis of gold and silver, linking the issuance of currency to metallic backing, while addressing the existing currency upon the establishment of the Islamic State through a mechanism that preserves the rights of its holders. The state does not view the required quantity of gold as merely a reserve against all forms of the modern money supply, but instead as the very basis for issuing currency and

preventing uncontrolled monetary expansion. On the international level, the return to gold and silver serves as a means to end dependency on dominant currencies, especially the dollar, and to establish more stable exchange rates.

As for investment, the state does not see that the absence of imposing interest on loans leads to stalling development. Instead, it replaces usurious financing with forms of investment, trade, company partnership including *mudharabah* (مصاربة capital and working partner association), and *ijarah* (leasing), whereby the return is linked to real economic activity. And in times of crises, the state does not rely on issuing uncovered money to provide liquidity, but rather on the state's resources, the *Bait ul-Mal* (بيت المال state treasury), gold and silver, and legitimate financing. This prevents turning the treatment of a liquidity crisis into a more severe inflationary crisis.

Contemporary capitalism possesses innovative tools for managing inflation: interest rates, liquidity management, inflation targeting, fiscal policy, and supply-side policies. These tools have proven their ability to influence demand, expectations, and prices, but they do not always have control over supply shocks, energy, wars, and structural imbalances. Furthermore, treating inflation within the capitalist system does not eradicate it at its roots, because the monetary system itself is built on fiat currencies, interest, credit, and monetary expansion. In contrast, the Islamic system offers a comprehensive framework comprising a monetary system based on gold and silver, the abolition of interest, the regulation of public and private ownership, and directing the state toward guaranteeing basic needs and achieving economic balance. It views inflation not merely as a technical issue for the central bank alone, but as a matter of independence, system, and state. In this conception,

currency is not merely a medium of exchange, but instead a part of the structure of the state's economic and political power. Therefore, the real cure begins by changing the monetary and economic foundation that produces imbalance and instability, replacing it with a comprehensive Islamic economic system.

Is a Military Coup Considered Among the Styles for Seizing Power in Islam? (Part 2)

Bassam Farhat – Tunisia

The Third Element: A Factional Move

The third element of a military coup is that it is factional, meaning it is carried out by a faction from the people, led by an individual or a small group—military or civilian—using a military instrument. In both cases, executing the coup does not require a large number of conspirators; rather, a relatively small number suffices, provided it controls sensitive junctures within the command structure of the military establishment or its powerful segment.

The burden of manufacturing coups does not fall upon the units and divisions that carried them out, but upon the heads of the leadership who decide on the military move and transform it into a political action. It is not a condition that the executing tools share the coup plotter's project, loyalties, or political orientations; rather, they are required merely to execute. This factionalism manifests in two primary forms,

First: That it be for personal gain, whereby a high-ranking military officer personally takes command of the military unit loyal to him or over which he has military authority (a battalion, brigade, company, army, etc.) and carries out the coup, installing himself at the head of the state (example: Thomas Sankara in Upper Volta and Ibrahim Traoré in Burkina Faso); or that a group of officers undertakes the leadership of the coup and then nominates one of its members to rule (example: the Free Officers in Egypt, Muhammad Naguib then Gamal Abdel Nasser).

Second: That it occurs by proxy on behalf of another military or civilian party, meaning the coup plotter remains in the background and requests that a military leader or a military unit—whether loyal to the plotter or subordinate to the coup leader—carry out the coup on his behalf, hand over the reins of power to him, and protect him (examples: Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr in Iraq, and Atassi in Syria). Ultimately, a military coup is not an expression of a popular movement nor an embodiment of a popular will; rather, it is a top-down, elitist political action executed by a military instrument that plans and implements it in isolation from the people.

The Objective Is to Establish the Authority of Islam

Although the Caesarean section is also a factional operation, just like a coup—meaning it is sufficient to win over those who control the sensitive junctures within the command structure of a part of the army, enabling them to mobilize it—this factional nature manifests practically in a manner that differs, both in ruling and in reality, from a coup. For Hizb ut Tahrir does not adopt material action and restricts its work in carrying the Dawah to thought alone; as for armed military action, it is not permitted for the Hizb to adopt it, even to remove the evil of the rulers or to assume power. It is only permissible for the Hizb to undertake intellectual and political actions. Consequently, the Hizb does not seek nussrah (نصرة military support) from itself; that is, it does not form an armed military group from its members to achieve nussrah and entrust to it the matter of the Caesarean section. Instead, it seeks nussrah from the people of nussrah—those possessing military power and capability—to support it and hand over authority to it.

This is a Shariah ruling among the rulings of the method (طريقة tareeqah), which we are not allowed to contravene: The

Messenger ﷺ confined his Dawah to intellectual and political actions, and it is not established that he ﷺ undertook any physical military actions during the Makkan Stage despite his capability to do so. This is at the level of the entity from whom nussrah (نصرة military support) is sought and who is to undertake the Caesarean section. As for the reality of nussrah and its Caesarean section process, it is not represented by asking a faction—be it an individual or a group of individuals—to take up arms and fight to hand over power to him, regardless of whether he participates in the fighting or not. The matter is not about using an armed gang, employing a mercenary army, or harnessing a blind, mute military unit that executes orders without thought to carry out armed physical actions and hand over power to him. Instead, it is a request directed by a political structure, which carries a political project, to a strong, influential, and powerful entity that has adopted its political project and is prepared to sacrifice for its sake to grant it nussrah so that it may seize power. This means it is a request from a political party to its supporters and backers—those who possess political weight and the ability to provide nussrah—to use their weight and capability to remove the material obstacles preventing the Hizb from achieving power. What is required is the establishment of the authority of Islam through those who support Islam and support the Hizb, not merely the seizure of power in an absolute sense. This is precisely what the Messenger ﷺ did: He would present himself as a sent Prophet and present Islam as an ‘Aqeedah (creed), an ideology, and a political project to the Arab tribes. If they believed him and had Iman in him, he would then request nussrah from them. Emulating him ﷺ requires that we act as he did, in the manner he did, for the sake of performing that very action.

Fourth Element: A Clandestine Move

The fourth element is that a military coup is clandestine: Given the vital nature of the decision and the objective, its lack of constitutional and legal legitimacy, and the fact that it is imposed upon the people and the military establishment, the coup event necessitates a high degree of secrecy and concealment—both in its general outlines and in its specific details and particulars—along with discipline, caution, wariness, and strict silence even from the executing elements, and this is because;

First: To ensure the neutrality of the executing group and the majority of the army who might not share the coup plotters' objectives, and to guarantee their compliance with military orders,

Secondly: To avoid being isolated before execution, which would cause the coup plotters to lose their legitimacy at the head of the military institution and, consequently, their ability to maneuver and deploy military forces,

Thirdly: To prevent information from leaking to the incumbent authority or to the foreign power that actually controls the country, thereby preempting the move and causing it to fail,

Fourthly: To ensure the element of surprise for the people, catching them off guard and presenting them with a fait accompli, thereby incapacitating them from taking any stance and compelling them to acquiesce and submit.

Deception, cunning, maneuvering, and absolute secrecy are fundamental characteristics of military coups. It is in the coup plotters' interest not to disclose their objectives, especially amid the international struggle for influence, interests, and wealth. Consequently, the armed forces move based on an order with an

unknown objective or a fictitious or false purpose, enabling the military leadership to execute swiftly and effectively. Therefore, upon their success, the coup plotters hasten to break this blackout, sever ties with rumors, and promote their own perspective and narrative of events. They do this by broadcasting the coup communiqué and subsequent statements through local and international media outlets and in official newspapers, thereby generating a supportive public opinion and cloaking their actions with a presumed constitutional and legal legitimacy.

A Political Context, Not a Military Overthrow

As for the Caesarean section, even if it is militarily secretive like a military coup, its underlying reality differs from it fundamentally and essentially: it agrees with it on a comprehensive, unchanging societal law that persists as long as humankind and its societies exist—namely, the necessity of relying on material power to establish or depose authority. However, it differs from a coup in the particulars, details, and practical application of this law on the ground: it is secretive like a coup, but its secrecy does not stem from a lack of constitutional and legal legitimacy. Instead, it arises from the desire to ensure the operation's success and to thwart any possibility of its failure and suppression in its infancy, based on the principle of (استعينوا) “Seek help in fulfilling your needs through secrecy.” Therefore, the Caesarean section is secretive in its specifics, details, and execution particulars (the individuals, location, time, timing, and method), but it is public in its preliminary signs and antecedents: it is not an intelligence operation plotted in the dead of night in the basements and corridors of embassies. A public opinion, emanating from a general awareness within the Ummah, has already consolidated around its intellectual-political project, and it has found a popular

base for it. Everyone knows that the Hizb seeks nussrah (نصرة military support) to achieve power as a method to implement that project. Indeed, the military establishment itself knows that there is a political Hizb knocking at its door, seeking its allegiance, and is aware of its project. Furthermore, the soldiers executing the operation must be aware of and consent to what they are undertaking, considering it the mother of all Shariah obligations and the most obligated of obligations incumbent upon them.

In conclusion, the Caesarean section is a political act executed through military means, which crowns a complete trajectory of political struggle and intellectual and political work at the heart of the Ummah; it is not a military overthrow imposed upon it. In contrast, a coup, being an unconstitutional, colonialist intelligence operation, requires absolute secrecy—even from the execution tools, let alone the Ummah—be it in its preludes and precursors or in its circumstances and details, necessitating deception, cunning, maneuverings, espionage, and betrayal.

Fifth Element: a Move Driven by Demands

The fifth element of a military coup is that it is a demand-driven move, meaning its motive and goal are partial and demand-specific, not extending beyond changing the ruling faction due to its failure in economic, social, or political particulars. The coup plotters are not proponents of an ideological project aimed at changing the state's doctrine and building its governance upon a new idea that elevates the people. In other words, they do not work to assume power as a method to actualize the ideas they adopt within society. At best, if they succeed, they might carry out some superficial, partial patchwork measures, such as declaring martial law, amending the constitution, or repealing a specific amendment within it.

By examining the experiences of the Coup Belt in West Africa south of the Sahara, we easily discern that they share the same catalysts: deteriorating human rights indicators, poverty, unemployment, dire social conditions, demographic pressures, various crises, political failure, economic stagnation, monopolization of wealth by the ruling elite, corruption, cronyism, absence of justice, lack of transparency, incompetence among officials, organized crime, terrorism, jihadist movements and obstruction of the peaceful transfer of power. Although these partial, demand-specific catalysts are, in reality, pretexts, excuses, and a cover for a fierce international struggle among the major powers (America, France, Britain, Russia, and China) over the continent's wealth and resources, they are nevertheless a lived reality in that region and genuine problems from which Africa suffers, requiring immediate treatment that justifies the coup movements.

Therefore, military coups have no connection to overarching principles, ideologies, or ideas, unlike revolutions: for the demands of revolutions are ideological and comprehensive, targeting the entire system of life. They are a total upheaval and a radical change in life, and their demands go beyond minor details to reach the intellectual foundations from which those corrupt details emanate (the French Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the Chinese Cultural Revolution). They are destined for success if undertaken with the appropriate political causes and societal laws. However, if the military action—which crowns their political and popular trajectory—fails, this is an indicator that they were merely a popular uprising with unclear objectives, lacking genuine popular support, and that their demands lack sufficient public opinion. Uprisings—even if they are popular in reality and have a specific, declared objective—

have immature, unstudied, and unrefined movements. They are also intermixed with personal motives and base ambitions; they are merely an instinctive reaction to a deteriorating reality and a chaotic, unorganized, and undisciplined movement, and thus their fate is abject failure.

Changing the State's 'Aqeedah (Creed)

In contrast, the Caesarean section is not merely a demand-driven move with a limited objective that does not go beyond changing colonialist allegiances and the ruling personnel at the behest of competing major powers, exploiting the people's discontent with the failures of the government's specific policies. Instead, it is a style for bringing a new political project to power: Hizb ut Tahrir's cause is to revive the Islamic creed ('aqeedah) among Muslims, and its goal is to establish ruling upon the Islamic ideology that the Ummah embraces. Consequently, its project is an ideological, creed-based, and comprehensive one that targets the entire system of life, aiming to change the state's creed and build its ruling governance upon a comprehensive idea that elevates the people. Thus, the Caesarean section leads to sweeping away the creed of separating religion from life and to implementing the Islamic creed in governance, social relations, and all systems of life—that is, it leads to applying the Shariah of Allah ﷻ upon the ruins of capitalist democracy.

It is a radical change that transcends partial patchworks to target the foundational ideological tenets that produced those corrupt particulars. Naturally, this targeting includes the bearers of those tenets and those responsible for implementing them, whether they are rulers or intellectual elites. Although it coincides with the concept of "revolution" in its societal sense—a popular movement to change the state's character and its ideology using military means—at the point of "radical

ideological change,” it remains a specific, distinct, and unique revolution, different from all other revolutions. Therefore, it must be distinguished by its ideological character, so we call it an “Islamic revolution.” As for the reason for its distinction and uniqueness, it lies in the general awareness (الوعي العام al-waie al-‘aam): the major revolutions that changed the course of history (the French Revolution and the Bolshevik Revolution)—despite being total, public, non-demand-based radical changes—relied on raw public opinion and rode the wave of popular discontent with a deteriorating reality to bring an elite consciousness to power on the people's shoulders. In these cases, the general awareness is after the fact and not prior; meaning, it is manufactured by the revolutionary system after its establishment, as a result of its control over power, and is neither a popular demand nor an expression of the people’s authority.

Sixth Element: A Sudden and Immediate Action

The sixth element of a military coup is that it is sudden and immediate, meaning it is self-contained and confined to the coup event itself, without prior introductions or circumstances. The requirements of secrecy in execution and concealment of the true objective dictate that the coup action is sudden, lacking clear, public precursors or preceding political or military actions. It is not the culmination of an apparent political or military process that it crowns and reaps the fruits of; in other words, it is not a reward or a final stage within a series of stages and phases already traversed, whether on the political or popular level. For the ultimate goal of a military coup is merely to usurp power; it does not view the act of seizing power as part of the work of building a state, because it does not aim to establish governance based on a specific overarching ideology—which would necessitate a long political struggle and intellectual and political

work at the heart of the people that precedes the seizure of power and is crowned by it, such as making the idea understood, generating responsiveness to it, consolidating public opinion and general awareness around it, and building a popular base for it.

And because they did not seize authority as an independent matter from its natural sources (the people or the strongest faction within it), the coup plotters are keen:

Firstly, to avoid targeting any specific political or societal party during the initial days, while distributing hope to everyone through a general and vague political discourse that satisfies all and displeases none, especially those who represent a potential danger (the remaining components of the army, parties, unions, journalists, businessmen, and religious figures).

Secondly, they carefully select elements from the old regime, either neutralizing them or forming temporary alliances with them, to soften the shock of sudden change upon them and their followers. This serves as a powerful political message about the futility of defending a system that even its closest associates have abandoned.

Thirdly, they diligently seek to win over the educated middle class—those who did not benefit from the outgoing regime—because their education qualifies them to provide effective support, and their deprivation gives them a psychological incentive to do so. Since the coup event is self-contained and confined to its immediate circumstances, it must be instantaneous, encapsulated within the initial military shock: it succeeds with the success of that shock and fails with its failure. The failure of the initial shock serves as an indicator of the failure of the entire movement, and may throw the country wide open

to a popular uprising, a bloody civil war, or a military rebellion that could either fail or succeed.

Thus, the military action serves as the method, that is, the permanent modality of the coup phenomenon. Therefore, in its absence or if it is dispensed with, the reality and nature of the event change, turning it into a “white coup” – a coup from within the state apparatus using political, not military, tools. As for the Caesarean section, it is a style for seizing power that may be employed, but the state could also be born using other styles, depending on what the reality of the support point dictates.

Building a State, Not Merely Assuming Power

The Caesarean section is not a sudden, immediate act that stands alone, reduced to mere military action like military coups. Instead, it is a political act executed through military means. It has public precursors, antecedent circumstances, and subsequent repercussions. It culminates a visible, overt political process and reaps its fruits as a partial and final stage within a series of actions, movements, and stages traversed across the Ummah to revive the Islamic creed, correct ideas, concepts, and convictions, and purify them from the blemishes of democracy and the filth of the Western viewpoint on life.

Therefore, the Hizb’s assumption of power differs from merely seizing power in that it necessitates establishing a popular base first before material power is secured. This is because the Ummah’s adoption of the Hizb’s project and the formation of a public opinion emanating from a general awareness about it are a fundamental condition and an essential matter for its success in achieving its goal. For our cause is not merely about assuming power alone; rather, our cause is building a state by reviving the creed within its presumed Muslim subjects. When this is achieved

and rapport with the Ummah is attained, the assumption of power follows naturally.

This direction is confirmed, **firstly**, by the nature of the desired state: It is an entity established upon the Islamic ideology adopted by the Hizb, serving as an executive apparatus for the concepts, criteria, and convictions emanating from it. To build this entity soundly and solidly, it is essential to fuse the Ummah within the crucible of the Hizb by establishing a public opinion emanating from a general awareness about that ideology and creating the popular base that embraces both the ideology and its carriers. For the state is the Ummah, such that if the idea of the state exists within the Ummah, then the state has been established. As for ruling governance, it is an act of its construction, and the Caesarean section is a style for its birth, not for its establishment.

Secondly, it is confirmed from the perspective of the nature of the desired revival (نهضة *nahdah*): Elevating society does not mean usurping power through a military coup and then establishing it upon the Islamic idea, for this does not bring about a revival. Instead, it means making the Ummah understand the Islamic idea with which it is to be revived and unifying it to proceed with this idea in the struggle of life. Then, power is taken to be established upon it, for governance is a method for renaissance if it is established upon the idea.

Thirdly, it is confirmed from the perspective of the reality of governance: Usurping power and imposing it upon the Ummah does not establish an Islamic rule—even if Sharia is applied—nor does it provide it with the means to endure and remain steadfast. Consequently, it will soon be uprooted or lose its Islamic character under pressure from the populace and enemies. As for the real guarantee for the stability and continuity of governance,

it is the process of societal integration and the popular base: Beyond being the foundation upon which public opinion and general awareness are built, it is what preserves the state and the Ummah, safeguards Islam, consolidates its ideas within society, and ensures the proper implementation of its rulings.

In this manner, the Khilafah (Caliphate) state becomes a true expression of the Ummah's authority and a genuine realization of its desire to live by Islam. It is thus born strong and resilient, secure on both its domestic and foreign fronts, with its formidable might, resounding reputation, and the Ummah's rallying around it. This provides it with the means for steadfastness, stability, security, and prosperity, especially in the face of the initial shock of its establishment and the onslaught of the disbelieving colonialists. Therefore, the failure of the Caesarean section operation to seize power—though unlikely—does not at all signify a failure of the movement akin to military coups: losing a battle does not mean losing the war, nor does it mean a change in the nature of the military action from a coup to a rebellion resembling immature popular uprisings, for the public opinion emanating from a general awareness and the popular base keep the ember of the movement ablaze until the state is established.

In Conclusion:

Following this comparative study, we conclude with full confidence that the military coup and the Caesarean section are two distinct political terms, differing fundamentally in their underlying reality (منطق *manaat*), constituent elements, meaning, and governing principles—which necessarily reflects on the semantic charge of each. Even though the military action upon which it is built or with which the political action is crowned is the common denominator between the coup phenomenon and the

Caesarean section, this does not at all mean that both fall within the circle of military coups: each is a political term standing on its own, established by political and military sociologists, as well as scholars of Shariah and law, even if they resemble and share some aspects and details:

Moreover, besides being a term with a negative connotation, open to chaos, barbarism, constitutional violation, and legal transgression—thus stigmatized as dictatorial and illegitimate—the constituent elements of a military coup explicitly declare its contradiction with the Caesarean section, leading us to conclude with certainty that it is not among the styles through which power is seized in Islam. The underlying reality (مناط *manaat*) of a military coup is entirely different from the underlying reality of the Caesarean section, and we are not permitted, from a Shariah perspective, to apply a ruling to a reality other than its own. Seizing power through a military coup means usurping power without it being the natural culmination of a process of political struggle within the heart of the Ummah—that is, without the establishment of public opinion emanating from general awareness, without the existence of a popular incubator, and without the societal integration process having occurred. Besides contradicting the method, this is practically barren: just as a Caesarean section is only performed on a pregnant woman when the fetus is fully developed, the gestation period is complete, signs of birth appear, and a specific obstacle exists that prevents the fetus from exiting naturally and threatens the demise of both it and its mother, so too do we only resort to the Caesarean section for seizing power when it is confirmed that there is a rapport between the Dawah carriers and society, that the state has formed within the womb of the Ummah, and that nothing remains to complete its construction but the actual seizing of

power, yet an unnatural foreign backing has prevented this, empowering the agents and obstructing the birth of the state.

This ultimate conclusion was the fruit of an ascending, progressive intellectual process, practically and field-engaged with carrying the call (dawah), theoretically and intellectually illuminated by the fragrant Prophetic Seerah (Sunnah). Herein, the Hizb distinguished between the style (أسلوب usloob) of seizing power and the method (طريقة tareeqah) of establishing the state. It explicitly stated in its bulletin titled “Our Cause is not Merely Seizing Power” dated 1968 that establishing governance upon the idea of Islam does not mean carrying out a military coup. This was followed by another bulletin, “Adopted Concepts,” in 1970, in which it declared that it does not wish to assume power through a military coup, thereby definitively excluding it from the list of styles for assuming power and, consequently, from the scope of the Caesarean section operation. (Concluded).

China's Rulers and Instructions for Spying on Muslims There and Restricting Them

In a dramatic shift from implementing Chinese government policy toward Muslims to becoming a dissenting voice in exile, Ma Ruilin revealed precise details of how Beijing tightens its grip on Muslim minorities.

In a series of interviews with The New York Times, the former Chinese Communist Party official described his journey from being a “cadre” enforcing Chinese policies to a believer practicing his faith covertly behind a motorcycle helmet. Ma Ruilin explains that he decided to speak out publicly because he wanted other Hui Muslims—who are suffering from despair in the darkness—to know they are not alone. Ruilin, 50, who held a mid-level position in the religious affairs bureaucracy of Gansu province, now lives in New York City, where he runs a halal food restaurant in Manhattan.

He recounts how the digital systems he helped design in 2008 turned into “shackles” that track worshippers through facial recognition technologies. Ma Ruilin says he lived years of a double life, implementing policies to control Muslims by day and sneaking into masajid by night. Describing that era, he says: “By day, my face was exactly like those of my colleagues..., but at night I would kneel on the prayer mat and transform into a completely different person.” He adds bitterly, speaking about the nature of Chinese Communist Party work: “To be a successful cadre, you must have strong loyalty to the Party but without humanity... You are trained to view other human beings as objects to be managed or dictated to.”

Ma Ruilin confesses to what he calls his “greatest sin”: building a database in 2008 to track masajid and religious scholars, a tool that the government later developed into a comprehensive surveillance system. He explains that the surveillance is carried out by cameras installed at mosque entrances that monitor how often an individual visits the masjid and with whom they interact. As for the consequences, Ma Ruilin says the data collected by the cameras leads to police interrogations, job loss, travel bans, or even being sent to “re-education” camps. Ma Ruilin comments on this with regret, saying: “I realized that the systems I helped build became shackles for Muslims... I handed the devil's whip to the state to use against my own community.”

Al-Waie Magazine: This is but a drop in the ocean of the hatred that fills the hearts of the disbelievers (kuffar) toward the Muslims. This is the condition of the Muslims without a state and an Imam to protect them and defend them; they are like orphans at the tables of the merciless, with no shield to protect them and no power to grant them justice. O Allah, hasten Your victory for us.

The Wealth of the Islamic Ummah is Sufficient for the Entire Ummah, But It Is Either “Stolen” or “Burned”

Saudi Arabia has announced estimated resources of around 114 million tonnes of ore in the Jabal Sayid project in the Al-Madinah Al-Munawwarah region, containing rare earth minerals and uranium concentrations, alongside plans to develop a local value chain extending to the production of yellowcake.

The announcement was made by Saudi Arabia’s Energy Minister, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, during the Kingdom’s address at the 70th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna as reported by the Saudi Press Agency (SPA). The Minister stated that exploration work and geological studies at Jabal Sayid revealed the presence of approximately 114 million tonnes of ore containing high concentrations of rare earth minerals, especially heavy elements, alongside what he described as promising concentrations of uranium.

The Minister added that pilot works, conducted in cooperation with the French company Orano, showed encouraging economic indicators, according to the Saudi side’s assessment. The Kingdom is also continuing its initiative to survey the sedimentary cover with the aim of exploring more uranium ore from its conventional sources.

On the nuclear energy front, Abdulaziz bin Salman confirmed that Saudi Arabia is working to introduce nuclear power into the national energy mix, referring to the cooperation agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, known as the 123

Agreement, which the Kingdom signed with the United States last July.

According to the Saudi Press Agency (SPA), the Minister stated that the implementation of the specific safeguard arrangements, associated with the cooperation between the two countries, will be under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, affirming the Kingdom's continued development of its regulatory and oversight system for nuclear energy.

Al Waie Magazine: The rulers of Al Saud have not been content with squandering the wealth of the Islamic Ummah on what does not please Allah ﷻ—such as buying football clubs or entertainment programs for astronomical sums, or opening the Bilad ul-Haramayn (بلاد الحرمين Land of the Two Sacred Masjids) to dancers and corruptors. Now, they even seek to exploit the issue of resources, like uranium, to grant the colonialist disbelievers additional “influence” in the country by appointing them as supervisors over what is permitted for work, including military aspects. Evil is what they judge.