Talk of “Israeli” intelligence infiltration of Iran and its allies is no longer merely a propaganda accusation in political wrangling. It is now reflected in the results of the operations themselves: the precision of the strikes, their timing, and the nature of the targets. When a state manages to repeatedly reach top-tier leaders, in supposedly the most fortified and secretive locations, the question today is no longer: Is there an infiltration? Instead, it is: What is the extent of this infiltration, and where do its ramifications end?

In this context, statements attributed to former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are widely circulating. He claimed that Iran established a unit to counter Mossad infiltration, only to discover — according to his account — that the head of that unit was himself a Mossad agent, along with other individuals within the same structure. This account, whether viewed as a shocking admission or as an indication of domestic conflict, reveals something more serious than the mere presence of spies: it raises the possibility of the very mechanisms for counter-infiltration being compromised. What happened in Lebanon strongly reinforced this notion. International reports have indicated that the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah was part of a series of strikes targeting the top military rank and file of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah, with reports suggesting that eight out of nine senior military commanders were killed in a short period, and that the Jewish entity possessed “real-time knowledge” of the leadership meeting. This level of success is not merely a matter of firepower. It is fundamentally a leveraged intelligence advantage — a success in infiltration, surveillance, and the patient development of long-term intelligence gathering.

Then comes the revealing, contrasting comparison with Yahya Sinwar. Despite being the occupying Jewish entity’s primary target, and despite an intensive manhunt that lasted for over a year, the Jewish entity’s own accounts — as reported by Reuters — claim that the force that killed him was initially unaware that it had encountered Sinwar, and that his death was not the result of a planned, intelligence-led strike like the assassinations of other leaders. Herein lies the difference between a target protected by rigorous field precautions, and environs whose security layers appear to have been eroded from within.

Today, with the rapidly unfolding reports of the deaths of prominent Iranian leaders in the recent strikes, and even the Supreme Leader himself in the initial attacks of the war, we see that what the Jewish entity is achieving in these confrontations must not be interpreted as merely the fruit of “military superiority.” Instead, it is the fruit of a deep intelligence infiltration. This infiltration is fueled by weak-willed individuals who sell information for a pittance, opening doors for the enemy that weapons alone could not have opened. From this springs the arrogance of the Jewish entity in the region. It believes that the path to key figures and sensitive circles has become shorter than the battlefields themselves. However, the picture is incomplete without considering the other side of the issue. The Iranian regime, whose policies have long contributed to subjugating the Ummah to the dictates of American plans, and subjecting its people to the bitterness of fragmentation and conflicts of attrition in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and elsewhere, is now drinking from the same cup. It is as if the laws of politics and history are returning to the regime because of what its hands have wrought, so that it may taste the consequences of the paths that weakened the Ummah and opened wide the way for the enemy to expand, not only by the power of iron, but through the cracks within, upon the borders of the fronts.